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Recent years have brought remarkable growth in hybrid
organizations that combine profit-seeking and social
missions. Despite popular enthusiasm for such organizations,
legal reforms to facilitate their formation and growth—
particularly, legal forms for hybrid firms—have largely been
ineffective. This shortcoming stems in large part from the
lack of a theory that identifies the structural and functional
elements that make some types of hybrid organizations more
effective than others. In pursuit of such a theory, this Article
focuses on a large class of hybrid organizations that has been
effective in addressing development problems, such as
increasing access to capital and improving employment
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opportunities. These organizations, which are commonly
referred to as “social enterprises,” include microfinance
institutions, firms that sell fair trade products, work
integration firms, and low-cost sellers of essential goods and
services such as eyeglasses, bed nets, and healthcare. The
common characteristic of social enterprises is that they have a
transactional relationship with their beneficiaries, who are
either purchasers of the firms’ goods or services or suppliers of
inputs (including labor) to the firm. The essence of this
Article’s theory is that through these transactions, social
enterprises perform a measurement role; that is, they measure
or gather information on their patron-beneficiaries’ abilities
to transact with commercial firms (for example, workers’
skills, borrowers’ creditworthiness, and consumers’ ability to
pay). That information permits social enterprises to tailor the
form and amount of subsidies to the specific needs of
individual beneficiaries. This “measurement” function makes
social enterprises relatively effective vehicles for allocating
subsidies as compared to traditional donative organizations
and other forms of hybrid organization, in particular firms
that pursue corporate social responsibility policies. Thus, the
measurement function can serve as the basis for designing a
legal form for social enterprises.
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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, there has been a remarkable increase in
the number of organizations that combine profit-seeking
with an altruistic or social mission. We can broadly term this
class of entities “hybrid organizations,” though a variety of
other terms have been used, including mixed-mission,
blended value, triple bottom line, and creative capitalism.1 In
particular, much attention—as well as legislative activity—
has focused on a broad but vaguely defined group of hybrid
organizations that are commonly referred to as “social
enterprises.” Common examples of social enterprises include
microfinance institutions that provide credit to low-income
borrowers, businesses that sell fair trade products, and
companies that sell affordable products in developing
countries. This pursuit of a mixed commercial and social
mission is not exclusively the domain of a small set of
specialized firms. Multinational corporations such as
Starbucks, Nike, and J.P. Morgan are increasingly engaged
in a variety of corporate social responsibility initiatives.2
Investors are increasingly mindful of social and
environmental indicators in their investment decisions, and
some focus on investing in firms that purport to generate
social impact.3 Thus, there is a growing popular belief that
combining profit and mission is an effective way of producing
social wealth.
Despite these wide-ranging developments, hybrid
organizations remain poorly understood. As a result, legal
The term “hybrid organization” is defined more formally in Part II.
See infra Sections II.C, VI.A.
3 See A NTONY B UGG -L EVINE & J ED E MERSON , I MPACT I NVESTING :
T RANSFORMING H OW W E M AKE M ONEY W HILE M AKING A D IFFERENCE
(2011); J.P. MORGAN GLOB. RESEARCH & THE ROCKEFELLER FOUND., IMPACT
INVESTMENTS:
AN
EMERGING
ASSET
CLASS
(2010),
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/socialfinance/document/impact_
investments_nov2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/8762-2NCF].
1
2
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policy in this field has been haphazard and largely
ineffective. First, there is some uncertainty about the extent
to which business planners have the power to form
businesses that combine profit and social missions. A recent
Delaware case, eBay v. Newmark, casts doubt on the ability
of corporations to espouse a social purpose.4 Partly to
address this issue, new legal forms have been introduced to
incorporate businesses that have a social mission.5 In
4 eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 28 (Del. Ch.
2010) (“The corporate form in which [the corporation] operates, however, is
not an appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic ends . . . Having chosen
a for-profit corporate form, the [corporation’s] directors are bound by the
fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those
standards include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the
benefit of its stockholders.”).
The eBay case reflects the conventional
view, dating back to Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, that the directors’
duty is to maximize shareholders’ profits. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919); see
also David A. Wishnick, Corporate Purposes in a Free Enterprise System: A
Comment on eBay v. Newmark, 121 Y ALE L.J. 2405 (2012). The eBay case
involved heightened scrutiny of a poison pill adopted by management in
order to entrench a social purpose to which the shareholders had never
acquiesced in the company’s charter or otherwise. eBay, 16 A.3d at 28, 32–
33.
5 For reviews of the new legal forms, see Dana Brakman Reiser,
Blended Enterprise and The Dual Mission Dilemma, 35 VT. L. REV. 105
(2010); Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62
EMORY L.J. 681 (2013); Matthew F. Doeringer, Fostering Social Enterprise:
A Historical and International Analysis, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291
(2010); Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise
Frontier, 84 T UL . L. R EV . 337 (2009); J. Haskell Murray, The Social
Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L. REV. 541 (2016); Alicia E. Plerhoples,
Social Enterprise as Commitment: A Roadmap, 48 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
89 (2015); Joseph W. Yockey, Does Social Enterprise Law Matter? 66 ALA.
L. REV. 767 (2015); Fabrizio Cafaggi & Paola Iamiceli, New Frontiers in the
Legal Structure and Legislation of Social Enterprises in Europe: A
Comparative Analysis (Eur. U. Inst. L. Working Papers, Paper No.
2008/16), http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/8927 [https://perma.cc/RCU55SH7]; Rachel Culley & Jill R. Horowitz, Profits v. Purpose: Hybrid
Companies and the Charitable Dollar (U. of Mich. Program in Law &
Econ.
Working
Paper
Series,
Paper
No.
12-006,
2012),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2055368
[https://perma.cc/T7LC-SDE6].
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particular, the Benefit Corporation is a legal entity that has
a social mission but can nonetheless distribute profits to its
owners. Although such legal forms have been diffusing
rapidly among states, most hybrid organizations continue to
use the traditional corporate forms. Thus, it is questionable
whether the new forms are actually necessary and how such
forms should be designed. Additionally, if hybrid
organizations are desirable, they arguably deserve to receive
tax or other subsidies. Malani and Posner, for example,
propose that all for-profits should be provided with tax
benefits for doing good things, such as selling fair trade
products.6 However, trusting profit-driven corporations to
employ subsidies towards social missions is highly
problematic, mainly because they have an obvious incentive
to overstate the social value of their activities in order to
enhance their reputations.7 As a result, the IRS has so far
resisted attempts to facilitate subsidized investments in
hybrid legal forms.8
The state of legal policy in this area stems from the
failure of economic and legal scholarship to identify the
structural and functional attributes that make hybrid
organizations effective in addressing social problems.
Despite the numerous colorful terms that have been attached
to hybrids, most of these terms boil down to the idea of

6 Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93
V A . L. R EV . 2017, 2064–67 (2007).
7 The well-known exposition of this view is by the economist Milton
Friedman, who urged corporations to focus on maximizing profits for the
firm’s owners while conforming to the basic legal and ethical rules of
society. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. T IMES M AG ., Sept. 13, 1970; see also Henry G.
Manne, Milton Friedman Was Right, W ALL . S T . J. (Nov. 24, 2006, 12:01
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116432800408631539
[https://perma.cc/UY66-HZAS].
8 See J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The L3C Illusion: Why
Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially
Optimal Private Foundation Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35
V T . L. R EV . 273 (2010).
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combining for-profit and altruistic missions.9 The problem is
that, in most cases, it is practically impossible to measure
and verify the accomplishment of altruistic goals.10
The definitions of hybrids under the statutes for
incorporating new organizational forms illustrate this
difficulty. For example, the “Benefit Corporation” is a
corporation whose purpose is to create a material positive
impact on society and the environment.11 However, it is
largely impossible to verify what qualifies as a “material

9 See, e.g., T HE E MERGENCE OF SOCIAL E NTERPRISE (Carlo Borzaga &
Jacques Defourny eds., 2001); BUGG-LEVINE & EMERSON, supra note 3;
Sutia Kim Alter, Social Enterprise Models and Their Mission and Money
Relationships, in S OCIAL E NTREPRENEURSHIP : N EW M ODELS OF
S USTAINABLE S OCIAL C HANGE 205, 205–06 (Alex Nicholls ed., 2006); J.
Gregory Dees, Enterprising Nonprofits, H ARV . B US . R EV ., Jan.–Feb. 1998,
at 55; Jed Emerson & Sheila Bonini, The Blended Value Map: Tracking
the Intersects and Opportunities of Economics, Social and Environmental
Value
Creation
(unpublished
manuscript)
(October
2003),
http://www.blendedvalue.org/wp-content/uploads/2004/02/pdf-bv-map.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FVY6-MHBQ].
10 Moreover, there is a tendency to treat the difference between
corporate social responsibility and social enterprise as mainly one of
degree, without delineating their different structures or functional roles.
See, e.g., T HE E CONOMICS OF S OCIAL R ESPONSIBILITY : T HE W ORLD OF
S OCIAL E NTERPRISES 7 (Leonardo Becchetti & Carlo Borzaga eds., 2011);
Alter, supra note 9; Kelley, supra note 5, at 350–52; Janet E. Kerr, The
Creative Capitalism Spectrum: Evaluating Corporate Social Responsibility
Through A Legal Lens, 81 T EMP . L. R EV . 831 (2008); Dana Brakman
Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 F ORDHAM L. R EV . 2437, 2450 (2009)
(arguing that “[s]ocial enterprises integrate philanthropy into their
business models at a more basic level than companies that make corporate
contributions or practice [Corporate Social Responsibility]”). In fact, the
terms are often used interchangeably to denote essentially the same type
of business. To take one example, firms that sell fair trade products have
been referred to as a social enterprise, T HE E CONOMICS OF S OCIAL
R ESPONSIBILITY , supra, corporate social responsibility initiative, Michael
E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy & Society: The Link Between
Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, H ARV . B US .
R EV ., Dec. 2006, at 78, and corporate philanthropy, Malani & Posner,
supra note 6.
11 See infra Section IX.A.
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positive impact,” and while the Benefit Corporation is a
laudable attempt to encourage corporations to produce such
an impact, it is highly doubtful that it has achieved this
effect. A recent example is Laureate University, a for-profit
network of universities incorporated as a Benefit
Corporation. Laureate recently completed its celebrated IPO,
the first of any Benefit Corporation.12 It is difficult, however,
to see what makes Laureate different from standard forprofit firms in the same industry. Recent evidence suggests
that it employs aggressive promotional tactics, suffers from
low graduation and loan repayment rates in some regions,
and primarily serves the premium segment of the market.13
While not incorporated as hybrids, the experiences of other
large companies that vowed to serve social and

12 See Alex Barinka, Laureate Education Plans IPO as a Public
Benefit
Company,
BLOOMBERG
(Oct.
2,
2015,
5:37
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-02/kkr-backed-laureateeducation-files-for-initial-public-offering
[https://perma.cc/8GA4-G69A];
Natalie Sherman, Laureate Becomes Public Company Again, Raising $490
Million,
BALTIMORE
SUN
(Feb.
1,
2017,
7:52
PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-laureate-ipo-20170201story.html [https://perma.cc/6KHP-HJA6].
13 See, e.g., Laureate Education Inc. Registration Statement (Form S1)
(Oct.
2,
2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/912766/000104746915007679/a22
09311zs-1.htm [https://perma.cc/A2F6-FJJL]; John Fritze & Natalie
Sherman, Laureate IPO Still Pending Amid Political Flap, Industry
Crackdown,
BALTIMORE
SUN,
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bs-md-laureate-faceschallenges-20161008-story.html [https://perma.cc/G3NA-UMXW] (Oct. 10,
2016, 7:17 PM); Janet Lorin, Laureate's U.S. Students Struggling to Repay
Loans as IPO Looms, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 4, 2015, 5:00 AM)
https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-11-04/laureate-loanrepayment-rate-shows-u-s-debt-burden-as-ipo-looms
[https://perma.cc/2FU5-EQZP]; Michael Smith & Mina Kimes, Chilean
Regulators Say No to Clinton-Backed University, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 4,
2014,
2:58
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-0124/chilean-regulators-crack-down-on-university-with-ties-to-clinton
[https://perma.cc/P8VG-QXD2].
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environmental missions, including Google, Etsy, and even
British Petroleum, range from disappointing to egregious.14
In order to develop legal policy in this area, there is a
need for a theory that identifies a set of organizations that
actually have incentives to pursue social missions effectively
and explains their functional role. This Article offers a
theory of social enterprise and hybrid organizations that can
inform legal policy. The theory focuses on a set of
organizations that are commonly referred to as “social
enterprises,” such as microfinance institutions, firms that
sell fair trade products, work integration social enterprises,
and low-cost sellers. The common characteristic of these
organizations is that they have a commitment to transacting
with their beneficiaries, who are either purchasers of the
firm’s goods or services or suppliers of inputs (including
labor) to the firm. This Article will refer to such beneficiaries
as “patron-beneficiaries.”15 For example, microfinance
institutions make loans to low-income borrowers, and work
integration social enterprises employ disadvantaged
workers. As this Article explains in greater detail below, it
may be prohibitively costly for standard commercial firms to
transact with disadvantaged individuals. This occurs for two
reasons: (1) firms lack information to evaluate the abilities of
such individuals, or (2) such individuals lack sufficient
abilities (e.g., ability to repay a loan). In these
circumstances, disadvantaged individuals may suffer from
lack of access to capital, systematic unemployment, and
want of essential products and services. Social enterprises

14 As discussed in Section VI.A below, Google’s charitable arm has
had limited social impact; Etsy, an online marketplace for crafts, is
certified by B-Lab, a nonprofit that certifies and ranks firms as producing
public benefits, but is also allegedly involved in aggressive tax planning.
See infra Section VI.C. Finally, British Petroleum, a company that had a
strong reputation for adopting environmentally friendly policies, was
responsible for a major oil spill in 2010. See infra Section VI.D.
15 The term “patron” is used to refer to those who have a transactional
relationship with the firm, i.e., investors, workers, suppliers, etc.
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address these problems by committing to transacting with
disadvantaged individuals as patrons.
This commitment induces social enterprises to perform a
measurement role. The financial viability of social
enterprises depends in large part on the performance of their
patron-beneficiaries. For example, microfinance institutions
are financially dependent on the ability of their borrowers to
repay their loans. Thus, social enterprises have incentives to
measure or gather information on their patron-beneficiaries’
attributes
(e.g.,
workers’
skills
or
borrowers’
creditworthiness) in order to ensure that they are capable of
performing their duties and tasks under their transactional
relationship with the social enterprise firm. This information
enables social enterprises to allocate subsidies (e.g., a
training subsidy) to their beneficiaries (e.g., disadvantaged
workers) effectively. In particular, social enterprises have
the ability and incentives to tailor the form and amount of
subsidies to their beneficiaries’ abilities and preferences as
well as the commercial needs of their business.
The measurement function makes social enterprises
relatively effective vehicles for allocating subsidies to
promote development goals, such as increasing access to
capital,
enhancing
productivity
and
employment
opportunities, and enhancing consumer welfare. For
example, microfinance institutions have grown substantially
in the last few decades and now provide financial services to
millions of poor customers in developing countries.16
The relative success of microfinance and other social
enterprises in spurring development contrasts with the
limited effectiveness of many organizations that engage
primarily in giving to beneficiaries (as opposed to
transacting with them), such as donative organizations like

16 B EATRIZ A RMENDÁRIZ & J ONATHAN M ORDUCH , T HE E CONOMICS OF
M ICROFINANCE 12–15 (2nd ed. 2010); B RIGIT H ELMS , A CCESS FOR A LL :
B UILDING I NCLUSIVE F INANCIAL S YSTEMS 2–5 (2006).
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government and aid agencies.17 Social enterprises also need
to be contrasted with other forms of hybrid organizations,
especially firms that engage in corporate charity and social
responsibility policies. Whereas social enterprises have
incentives to utilize subsidies effectively, corporations that
pursue socially responsible policies have incentives to
exaggerate their social value.
From a theoretical perspective, this Article contributes to
understanding the functional role of different forms of
organization. The theory proposed is related to the wellknown “metering” theory of Alchian and Demsetz, which
argues that firms arise as a solution to problems in metering
or measuring input productivity and rewards,18 and that
nonprofits are likely to shirk because they have limited
incentives to meter productivity.19 However, unlike Alchian

17 The term “donative organization” was defined by Hansmann to
mean nonprofits that receive most or all of their income in the form of
grants or donations. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit
Enterprise, 89 Y ALE L.J. 835, 840 (1980). This Article will argue that
donative organizations are also characterized by the fact that they
transfer a subsidy to their beneficiaries rather than transacting with them
as patrons. See infra Part II.
18 As stated by Alchian and Demsetz: “If the economic organization
meters poorly, with rewards and productivity only loosely correlated, then
productivity will be smaller; but if the economic organization meters well
productivity will be greater.” Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz,
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 A M . E CON .
R EV . 777, 779 (1972). More broadly, Alchian and Demsetz seek to explain
why firms are an efficient means for organizing economic activity (as
opposed to contracts) when individual output is difficult to observe but
collective output is observable. Id.
19 Id. at 789–90. In contrast, as shown by Hansmann, supra note 17,
nonprofits may actually have stronger incentives to produce higher
quality. See also Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Not-For-Profit
Entrepreneurs, 81 J. OF P UB . E CON . 99 (2001) (developing an economic
model of Hansmann’s theory); cf. Albert H. Choi, Nonprofit Status and
Relational Sanctions: Commitment to Quality through Repeat Interactions
and Organizational Choice, 58 J.L. & E CON . 969 (2015) (offering an
economic model where stronger relational sanctions by consumers against
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and Demsetz, this Article draws a distinction between
transacting and giving organizations, rather than
emphasizing the distinction between for-profits and
nonprofits.20 The reason is that social enterprises that
engage in market transactions may be formed not only as
for-profits, but also as nonprofits, and in either case, they
have a financial (as well as altruistic) incentive to measure
the output of their beneficiaries and to tailor subsidies to
their needs.
From a policy perspective, understanding the basic
structure of social enterprises and the measurement function
they perform is essential for informing policies to encourage
corporations to pursue social missions. Since social
enterprises appear to be effective, legal policy should
primarily foster organizations that share their structural
and functional attributes. Section IX outlines how the
transaction with beneficiaries and the measurement role of
social enterprises can provide a normative framework for
designing a legal hybrid form.21 This Article focuses on
laying out the structural and theoretical underpinnings of
social enterprises as well as other hybrid organizations.
This Article is organized as follows: Section II discusses
the structure of different forms of hybrid organizations, and
in particular social enterprises. Section III describes in detail
the measurement theory of social enterprise. Section IV
applies the theory to different forms of social enterprises.
Section V describes the different devices social enterprises
employ to commit to transacting with disadvantaged groups.
for-profits cause for-profits to produce quality equivalent to that of
nonprofits).
20 To be fair, Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 18, wrote at a time when
nonprofits were less commercialized and hence less likely to engage in
market transactions. For discussion of the commercialization of nonprofits,
see T O P ROFIT OR N OT TO P ROFIT : T HE C OMMERCIAL T RANSFORMATION OF
THE N ONPROFIT S ECTOR (Burton A. Weisbrod ed., 1998).
21 See infra Section IX. Details of the policy implications are discussed
in Ofer Eldar, Designing Organizations to Pursue Social Goals: An
Economic Analysis of Legal Hybrid Forms (on file with author).
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Section VI contrasts social enterprises with other hybrid
organizations that engage primarily in giving to beneficiaries
rather than transacting with them. Section VII notes several
disadvantages of social enterprises. Section VIII explains
why other theories of hybrid organizations fail to explain the
structure and role of hybrid organizations. Section IX
discusses why legal hybrid forms have been largely
ineffective in encouraging firms to address social missions
and how the theory put forth in this Article can inform the
design of a new legal hybrid form.

II. THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF
SOCIAL ENTERPRISES AND HYBRID
ORGANIZATIONS
Although hybrid organizations are commonly defined as
organizations that combine profit and altruistic or social
missions, this definition is misleading. Even profitmaximizing firms pursue social purposes, albeit indirectly.
Consider a food chain that improves the nutritional value of
its products. Such a firm may be maximizing its profits by
making its products more attractive to customers. Its
activities may well generate positive externalities, such as
better health for society. This firm, however, is not
conceptually different from most other for-profit firms. The
idea that firms generate positive externalities while
pursuing profits dates back to Adam Smith’s notion of profit
maximization.22 A useful definition of hybrid organizations
must identify the way they differ from standard profitmaximizing firms.
Properly defined, a hybrid organization is a commercial
enterprise that channels a subsidy to a class of beneficiaries.
The simplest example is a corporate charity, which is a forprofit firm that donates a percentage of its profits to charity.
The subsidy need not be provided by the government and

See A DAM S MITH , A N I NQUIRY
W EALTH OF N ATIONS (1776).

22

THE

INTO THE

N ATURE

AND

C AUSES

OF
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usually flows from the firm’s customers and investors. To
fund the charity, the owners of the firm may agree to some
discount on their returns or the consumers may pay
premium prices for the firm’s products. Thus, this Article
defines “subsidy” expansively to include any contribution of
value—monetary or otherwise—that is provided to the
ultimate beneficiary of the subsidy for no consideration. It
need not be a direct subsidy, like a grant or a donation, but
may also take the form of premiums over market prices paid
by consumers or discounts to market returns on
investment.23
It is important to note that the term “hybrid
organization” can be used to describe a wide array of
organizations. On one hand, a hybrid organization may be
profit-maximizing as long as the owners do not provide the
subsidy. For example, a firm may receive a grant from the
government or its consumers may pay premium prices. On
the other hand, hybrid organizations may be nonprofits. A
commercial enterprise is any enterprise that receives a
significant portion of its income from prices charged for its
products or services so that its viability or sustainability is
dependent on such income.24 Commercial enterprises include
not only for-profit firms, but also commercial nonprofits such
as hospitals or universities that charge patients and
students respectively for their services,25 despite receiving at
least some subsidies in the form of donations and tax
exemptions.

The difference between premium prices or below-market rates and
market prices or rates (as applicable) constitutes the subsidy.
24 This Article refers to “enterprises” rather than organizations or
entities. An enterprise may comprise an entity or several entities, but may
also be a segment of an organization that includes various types of
enterprise.
25 See Hansmann, supra note 17, at 840–41.
23
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A. What Makes an Organization a Social Enterprise?
The focus of this Article is on a particular type of hybrid
organization, usually referred to as a “social enterprise.”
Social enterprises are not only subsidized commercial
enterprises, but they also possess another critical element:
they have a commitment to transact with their beneficiaries
as patrons, for instance, as customers or providers of input
(see Figure 1). This commitment arises in circumstances
where such beneficiaries are unable to transact with
commercial firms under standard commercial terms. For
example, microfinance institutions lend money to their
beneficiaries, who are disadvantaged individuals or
businesses that face difficulties in obtaining capital from
commercial lenders. Section III presents the economic
function of this transactional relationship. Social enterprises
do not necessarily transfer subsidies to their patronbeneficiaries (e.g., discounts on loans or products), although
many of them do. To count as social enterprises, they need
only have a commitment to transact with their beneficiaries,
even if no actual transfer of subsidies is made to the
beneficiaries.

1. Examples of Social Enterprises
The following paragraphs describe the business and
structure of different types of social enterprise. All of the
social enterprises described engage in development missions,
such as increasing access to capital, improving productivity
and employment opportunities, and enhancing consumer
welfare. The description does not exhaust all forms of social
enterprise; rather, this Article provides an example of each
of the main industries in which social enterprises operate.
For present purposes, the Article will focus on for-profit
social enterprises and discuss social enterprises formed as
nonprofits in the following Section.
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FIGURE 1: SOCIAL E NTERPRISE

Owners/
Investors

Customers

Patron Beneficiaries

Social
Enterprise

Donors/
Government

Employees/
Managers

A social enterprise is a subsidized commercial enterprise (for-profit or
nonprofit) with a commitment to transacting with a class of patronbeneficiaries. The patron-beneficiaries may belong to any class of the
firm’s patrons, including some or all of its customers, employees, or
suppliers. The subsidy to the firm may be provided by donors,
government or any other class of patrons. A one-sided light grey arrow
is used to denote a subsidy. A two-sided dark grey arrow is used to
denote a transactional relationship with a patron.

Microfinance Institutions (“MFIs”): MFIs provide
loans and other financial services to poor customers in
developing countries who lack access to capital. MFIs
specialize in making small short-term loans, which are
unprofitable for commercial banks but are essential for poor
households and small businesses in developing countries. A
well-known MFI is Compartamos, which lends mainly to the
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moderately poor. Compartamos is a for-profit owned by a
consortium of NGOs, foundations and social entrepreneurs.
Although it underwent an IPO in 2007, the consortium
shareholders continue to own a controlling interest in the
company.26 The NGOs and the International Finance
Corporation provided the initial subsidy to the firm in the
form of seed capital, which was funded by donations. In
addition, the owners may provide a subsidy to the firm to the
extent that the firm forgoes opportunities to serve wealthier
individuals. Although Compartamos has been very
profitable, it could arguably be more profitable if it served
more affluent borrowers.27 Compartamos does not transfer
subsidies directly to its customer-beneficiaries like other
MFIs, for example in the form of lower rates;28 rather, the
main benefit it confers on them is the opportunity to borrow.
Credit
Development
Financial
Institutions
(“CDFIs”): CDFIs provide financial products to low-income
customers in the U.S. that are generally not available from
26 COMPARTAMOS, S.A.B. DE C.V., 2012 ANNUAL AND SUSTAINABLE
REPORT
86
(2013),
https://www.compartamos.com/wps/themes
/html/mango/media/CompartamosInformeWeb2012/compartamos%20ingle
s/pdfs/informe_anual_y_sustentable_2012_Grupo_Compartamos.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/GV5M-KE7B]; BANCO COMPARTAMOS, S.A., OFFERING
CIRCULAR 127–28 (2007), https://www.compartamos.com/wps/wcm/connect
/?MOD=PDMProxy&TYPE=personalization&ID=NONE&KEY=NONE&LI
BRARY=%252FcontentRoot%252Ficm%253Alibraries&FOLDER=%252FR
elacion+con+Inversionistas%252FInformacion+Corporativa%252FProspect
o+de+Colocacion+En%252F&DOC_NAME=%252FcontentRoot%252Ficm%
253Alibraries%252FRelacion+con+Inversionistas%252FInformacion+Corp
orativa%252FProspecto+de+Colocacion+En%252FProspecto+de+Colocacio
n+Ingles+(Offerong+circular).pdf&VERSION_NAME=NONE&VERSION_
DATE=NONE&IGNORE_CACHE=false&CONVERT=text/html&MUST_C
ONVERT=false [https://perma.cc/HKT3-6RA7] [hereinafter COMPARTAMOS
OFFERING CIRCULAR].
27 On the other hand, the most profitable strategy for Compartamos
may be to specialize in loans to the moderately poor, in which case no
further subsidy is provided by the owners (other than the seed capital).
28 In fact, its rates are known to average nearly 90%. See Michael
Chu, Commercial Returns at the Base of the Pyramid, I NNOVATIONS ,
Winter/Spring 2007, at 115, 126.

ELDAR – FINAL

No. 1:92]

SOCIAL ENTERPRISE & HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS

109

mainstream commercial banks, particularly depository
services, home mortgages, and loans to small businesses. An
example of a CDFI is the Carver Federal Savings Bank, a
New York bank created to serve low-income AfricanAmerican communities.29 The bank is held by Carver
Bancorp, Inc., a holding company whose shares are traded on
the NASDAQ.30 CDFIs are certified as such by a government
agency, the CDFI Fund, which provides subsidies to CDFIs
in different forms, including subsidized equity investments,
guaranties, and grants.31 To be certified, a firm must satisfy
certain requirements to lend to low-income borrowers.32 The
CDFI Fund also enters into an Assistance Agreement with
each CDFI that is awarded assistance.33 The agreement
incorporates performance goals to be accomplished by the
CDFI, the scale of its activities, and the terms offered to lowincome borrowers (e.g., below-market rates).34 Equity
investors in CDFIs are typically also eligible for tax credit
incentives under the New Markets Tax Credits program.35
29 See CARVER BANCORP, INC., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K), at 3 (June
29,
2015),
http://www.snl.com/interactive/lookandfeel/112079/
AnnualReport_ 2015_.pdf [https://perma.cc/MX4R-QWZA].
30
See
Corporate
Profile,
CARVER
FED.
SAV.
BANK,
http://www.snl.com/irweblinkx/corporateprofile.aspx?iid=112079
[https://perma.cc/QTG3-K2ZU] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
31 See Lehn Benjamin et al., Community Development Financial
Institutions: Current Issues and Future Prospects, 26 J. U RB . A FF . 177,
177–79 (2004); CDFI Types, CDFI COALITION, http://www.cdfi.org/aboutcdfis/cdfi-types/ [https://perma.cc/3DF4-NFLZ?type=image] (last visited
Mar. 18, 2017).
32 For example, an applicant for CDFI certification must serve a
Target Market, which is defined to include areas where the percentage of
the population living in poverty is at least 20%, where the median family
income is below 80% of the national median family income, or where the
unemployment rate is 1.5 times the national average. See 12 C.F.R. §
1805.201(3) (2016).
33 12 C.F.R. § 1805.801 (2016).
34 Id.
35 See Julia Sass Rubin & Gregory M. Stankiewicz, The New Markets
Tax Credit Program: A Midcourse Assessment, 1 C OMMUNITY D EV . I NVEST .
R EV . 1, 3 (2005).
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Social Investment Firms: Social investment firms make
relatively small investments in businesses, including in
other social enterprises, which are perceived as too risky for
commercial investors, such as private equity and venture
capital firms. While some social investment firms aim at
earning near-competitive returns, others expect belowmarket returns.36 Triodos Bank N.V., a bank based in the
Netherlands, lends to businesses and nonprofits that have
some social or ecological benefit, such as MFIs, fair trade
social enterprises (discussed below), organic farms, and
renewable energy projects.37 The subsidy in the case of
Triodos Bank flows from its equity holders that hold
depository receipts and earn only moderate returns on
equity.38 The depository receipts are publicly listed and
traded on a matched bargain system.39 The voting rights in
Triodos Bank are held by a foundation which makes voting
decisions on behalf of the holders of depository receipts, and
is required to exercise its voting rights in a manner
consistent with its ethical goals and mission, its business

J.P. MORGAN GLOB. RESEARCH & THE ROCKEFELLER FOUND., supra
note 3, at 6; ROCKEFELLER PHILANTHROPY ADVISORS, SOLUTIONS FOR IMPACT
INVESTORS: FROM STRATEGY TO IMPLEMENTATION 11–12 (2010),
http://www.rockpa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/MONOSolutionForImpactInvestors2.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8Y5-T58H]; MONITOR
INST., INVESTING FOR SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT: A DESIGN FOR
CATALYZING
AN
EMERGING
INDUSTRY
31
(2009),
http://monitorinstitute.com/downloads/what-we-think/impactinvesting/Impact_Investing.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TNY-TME7].
37 What We Do, TRIODOS BANK, https://www.triodos.com/en/abouttriodos-bank/what-we-do/ [https://perma.cc/M4QN-AY8G] (last visited
Mar. 18, 2017).
38 TRIODOS
BANK,
2015
ANNUAL
REPORT
4
(2016),
https://www.triodos.com/downloads/about-triodos-bank/annualreports/triodos-bank-annual-year-report-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/AP6QMKDW] [hereinafter TRIODOS BANK ANNUAL REPORT 2015]. The return on
equity in 2015 was 5.5% (up from 4.4% in 2014). Id.
39 A matched bargain system is a system for trading stocks that
matches a buy offer directly with a sell offer. Such a system tends to be
less liquid than standard stock exchanges.
36
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interests, and the interests of the depository receipt
holders.40
Low-Cost Sellers: There are various types of
organizations that sell affordable products or services to poor
customers in developing markets, such as bed nets,
eyeglasses, and healthcare services.41 A to Z Textile Mills of
Tanzania is a producer of long-lasting insecticide-treated bed
nets.42 A to Z is a for-profit firm that entered into a
partnership that includes the World Health Organization,
NGOs, and other large commercial firms. Pursuant to the
partnership, A to Z is committed to selling bed nets in
Tanzania, and the other partners provide it with various
forms of subsidy, such as free use of technology and loans at
below-market rates to buy machinery and specialized
chemicals.43 A to Z employs a price differentiation scheme,
whereby bed nets are either sold at market price ($5 each) or
through the partnership to vulnerable groups at a discount
paid by the partnership or the Tanzanian government.44
Fair Trade Social Enterprises (“FTSEs”): FTSEs buy
their inputs (such as coffee beans) from small producers in
developing countries.45 The subsidies to FTSEs flow
primarily from their consumers who are willing to pay a
TRIODOS BANK ANNUAL REPORT 2015, supra note 38, at 39.
See generally ASHISH KARAMCHANDANI ET AL., EMERGING MARKETS,
EMERGING MODELS: MARKET-BASED SOLUTIONS TO THE CHALLENGES OF
GLOBAL
POVERTY
(2009),
http://www.beyondthepioneer.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/04/emergingmarkets_full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6FDG-KS3T]; C. K. P RAHALAD , T HE F ORTUNE AT THE
B OTTOM OF THE P YRAMID : E RADICATING P OVERTY T HROUGH P ROFITS
(2010).
42 See WINIFRED KARUGU & TRIZA MWENDWA, A TO Z TEXTILE MILLS: A
PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP PROVIDING LONG-LASTING ANTI-MALARIA BED
NETS
TO
THE
POOR
2
(2007),
http://healthmarketinnovations.org/sites/default/files/A%20To%20Z%20Te
xtiles%20Case%20Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/F88L-SHGJ].
43 Id. at 9–10.
44 Id. at 11.
45 See generally A LEX N ICHOLLS & C HARLOTTE O PAL , F AIR T RADE :
M ARKET -D RIVEN E THICAL C ONSUMPTION (2005).
40
41
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premium on fair trade products.46 Sales of fair trade products
have increased dramatically in the last twenty years.47 Large
corporations, such as Starbucks and Nestle, sell fair trade
products. There are also many firms that only sell fair trade
products, such as Cafédirect, a prominent hot drinks
company in the UK. Cafédirect products are certified by
Fairtrade International (“FLO”).48 The Fair Trade mark is
attached to products that comply with the Fair Trade
standards to signal to consumers that they deserve a
premium over other products.49 The Fair Trade standards
certify, inter alia, that the producers are “small producers,”
broadly defined as those who produce labor-intensive
products but employ a limited number of permanent workers
DANIELE GIOVANNUCCI & FREEK JAN KOEKOEK, THE STATE OF
SUSTAINABLE COFFEE: A STUDY OF TWELVE MAJOR MARKETS 40 (2003),
http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?pno=579
[https://perma.cc/VQ27-KL9H].
47
See Rebecca Smithers, Global Fairtrade Sales Reach £4.4bn
Following 15% Growth During 2013, GUARDIAN (Sept. 3, 2014, 11:23 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/sep/03/global-fairtrade-sales-reach-4-billion-following-15-per-cent-growth-2013
[https://perma.cc/XZE9-R3MP]; Press Release, Research Reveals Increased
Consumer Demand for Fair Trade Certified-Labeled Products, Fair Trade
USA
(Apr.
25,
2011),
https://fairtradeusa.org/pressroom/press_release/research-reveals-increased-consumer-demand-fairtrade-certified-labeled-pro [https://perma.cc/2KP5-7ADV]; cf. Sarah Butler,
Fairtrade Sales Fall for First Time in Foundation’s 20-Year Existence,
GUARDIAN
(Feb.
22,
2015,
7:01
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/feb/23/fairtrade-sales-fallfirst-time-20-year-existence [https://perma.cc/6TLM-JFA6].
48
See Cafédirect: A Fairtrade Pioneer, FAIRTRADE INT’L (June 20,
2011),
https://www.fairtrade.net/new/latest-news/singleview/article/cafedirect-a-fairtrade-pioneer.html
[https://perma.cc/4AK6NDF2]. Note though that Fair Trade standards do not exist for all
products, including many types of fruits and handicrafts. See Standards
for
Small
Producer
Organizations,
FAIRTRADE
INT’L
(2014),
https://www.fairtrade.net/standards/our-standards/small-producerstandards.html [https://perma.cc/C87H-RE5K].
49 Certification for products rather than firms enables the same firm
to have and operate both a social enterprise and a profit-maximizing
enterprise (e.g., Starbucks selling fair trade products).
46
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or rely on family labor.50 Moreover, FLO ensures (through
audits and inspections) that the importer pays producers the
Fair Trade minimum price, provides them with a “social
premium” that must be used for developing their community,
and, when requested, extends them pre-financing of up to
60% of the orders.51
Though many FTSEs rely exclusively on subsidies from
consumers, shareholders appear to provide Cafédirect’s
subsidy by accepting below-market returns.52 Cafédirect
seems to use such subsidies to pay a higher price and a
higher social premium than that mandated by the Fair
Trade standards.53 The shares of Cafédirect are publicly
listed and traded on a matched bargain exchange.54 While
shareholders do have voting rights, there is also a guardian
share, which is held by a subsidiary of Oxfam and a
cooperative of producers that transact with the firm.55 The
guardian share has the right to block any changes to the
company’s objectives to sell exclusively fair trade products
and reinvest a third of the profits in growers’ communities.56

FAIRTRADE INT’L, FAIRTRADE STANDARD FOR SMALL PRODUCER
ORGANIZATIONS
§
1.2
(2011),
https://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin
/user_upload/content/2009/standards/documents/generic-standards/
SPO_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/FMU6-TFME].
51 Id. § 4.1; FAIRTRADE INT’L, FAIRTRADE STANDARD FOR COFFEE FOR
SMALL
PRODUCER
ORGANIZATIONS
§§
4.2–4.3
(2011),
https://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user_upload/content/2009/standards/d
ocuments/2012-04-01_EN_SPO_Coffee.pdf [https://perma.cc/WPY6-EB2V].
52 CAFÉDIRECT,
2014
ANNUAL
REPORT
(2015),
http://www.cafedirect.co.uk/wpcontent/uploads/downloads/2015/05/FINAL-Annual-Review-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FXD8-BUNU] (“Cafédirect has built over the years a big
pool of friends who have continued to support the business despite
declining sales. Shareholders have really been very understanding given
that no dividends have been declared in successive years.”).
53 Id. at 3.
54 Id. at 10.
55 Id., at 28.
56 Id.
50
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Work Integration Social Enterprises (“WISEs”):
WISEs are businesses that employ disadvantaged workers
who suffer from systemic unemployment. Disadvantaged
employees include disabled people, ethnic minorities,
individuals with a criminal record, and members of lowincome communities.57 WISEs usually sell products or
services that require a large number of low-skilled employees
in industries such as food, catering, and custodial services.
A notable example is the Greyston Bakery, a growing
business that specializes in gourmet brownies and baked ice
cream ingredients. The Greyston Bakery hires workers in a
low-income area in Yonkers, New York who have little or no
education or employment records.58 Unlike other WISEs that
pay fair market wages to their worker-beneficiaries, the
bakery pays its workers a salary that reflects their average
productivity without a wage premium.
The Greyston Foundation, a nonprofit dedicated to
promoting community development primarily through
employment programs, owns the bakery.59 The bakery has
received subsidies from various sources. The foundation
provided capital to the bakery presumably using donative
funds. The foundation also provides training, housing
assistance, and childcare services to the workers (among

J ERR B OSCHEE , S OCIAL E NTERPRISE S OURCE B OOK (2001),
http://www.socialent.org/pdfs/GREYSTONBAKERY.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5B4V-2R27]; Catherine Davister et al., Work Integration
Social Enterprises in the European Union: An Overview of Existing Models
11–12
(EMES
Working
Paper
No.
04/04,
2004),
http://emes.net/publication-categories/working-papers/
[https://perma.cc/WWS2-EDWB].
58 BOSCHEE, supra note 57, at 78–83; Michael Barker et al., A Case
Study on Greyston Bakery: The Do-Goodie Product Launch 2 (May 15,
2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author) [hereinafter
Barker et al., The Do-Goodie Product]; Michael Barker et al., Greyston
Bakery: The Costs and Benefits of an Open Hiring Policy 1 (May 15, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Barker et
al., Open Hiring Policy].
59 See Barker et al., The Do-Goodie Product, supra note 58, at 3.
57
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others).60 Moreover, the bakery has been receiving favorable
trade terms from its well-known customer, the ice cream
company Ben & Jerry’s, including a willingness to adjust the
terms of transactions if performance is not adequate or
timely.61 The bakery also markets its social mission to attract
premiums from consumers.62

2. The Structure of For-Profit Social Enterprises
For-profit social enterprises are not solely characterized
by having a transactional relationship with a class of
beneficiaries—in addition, they all have some contractual
relationship with a nonprofit entity. Each of the social
enterprises described above is either controlled or certified
by a nonprofit or has a contract with one. This Article uses
the term “nonprofit entity” loosely to include not only
nonprofit corporations, but also government agencies and
multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank. All
these entities are effectively subject to a constraint on
distribution, i.e., those who control the organization cannot
distribute earnings to themselves. Social entrepreneurs, i.e.,
individuals with a strong reputation for pursuing altruistic
missions who may also be viewed as being subject to some
constraint on distribution,63 are also included in this
definition of nonprofit entity.
The role of the nonprofit is essentially to ensure that the
for-profit social enterprise transacts with its beneficiaries as
patrons, and in some cases also allocates a subsidy to them.
There are essentially three mechanisms by which the
nonprofit monitors the for-profit entity: (1) Certification
mechanisms: firms or products are certified as a form of
social enterprise in accordance with certain standards. As
BOSCHEE, supra note 57, at 83.
Barker et al., The Do-Goodie Product, supra note 58, at 8.
62 See id. at 1–2.
63 Social entrepreneurs effectively pledge their reputation as a
commitment not to pursue excessive profits at the expense of the interests
of third-party beneficiaries.
60
61
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discussed above, the products of FTSEs are certified by FLO,
to ensure that the firm transacts with “small producers” and
extends them favorable terms. Likewise, CDFIs are certified
as financial institutions that serve low-income communities.
(2) Contractual mechanisms: a contract between the
social enterprise and a nonprofit can require the social
enterprise to transact with disadvantaged individuals. As
discussed above, A to Z entered into an agreement with
certain nonprofits to sell affordable bed nets to low-income
consumers. Likewise, CDFIs enter into an assistance
agreement with the CDFI Fund that dictates the terms
extended by CDFIs to their consumers (e.g., discounted
interest rates). (3) Control mechanisms: the for-profit is
controlled, through ownership or voting rights, by a
nonprofit that ensures that the for-profit transacts with a
disadvantaged group. This mechanism is used by many
forms of social enterprise, including MFIs such as
Compartamos, social investment firms such as Triodos Bank,
WISEs such as the Greyston Bakery, and even FTSEs such
as Cafédirect.
Each of these mechanisms essentially serves as a
commitment
device
to
subsidy
providers—whether
government, consumers or investors—ensuring that their
subsidy is being used for its intended purpose. As explained
in greater detail below, transactions with disadvantaged
patrons are costly and require a subsidy. In the case of forprofit social enterprises, there is a clear risk that the subsidy
they receive will be distributed to the firm’s owners or
misused by the managers. Thus, for-profit social enterprises
must adopt one or more commitment devices to assure
subsidy providers that the subsidy will not be expropriated.
Section V explores the choice of commitment device in
greater detail. For present purposes, the following analysis
assumes that social enterprises are subject to some
commitment device that ensures that they transact with a
class of disadvantaged patrons.
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3. Social Enterprises as Commercial Nonprofits
Social enterprises (as hybrid organizations) may be—and
many are—formed as nonprofits. Nonprofit social enterprises
fall under the definition of commercial nonprofits, which
receive a substantial part of their income from selling
products or services.64 They are also hybrid organizations as
they all receive some form of subsidy, whether from income
tax exemptions or donations. In this case there is only one
entity, the nonprofit social enterprise. For nonprofit social
enterprises, the commitment device is simply the nondistribution constraint and the nonprofit form. Those who
control the organization have limited incentives to
compromise the mission of the organization, which is to
transact with disadvantaged individuals.65 There are many
examples of nonprofit social enterprises. Some of the largest
and most influential MFIs are nonprofits, including BRAC
and ASA in Bangladesh. Community loan funds, a form of
CDFI that focuses on loans to nonprofits and small
businesses, are typically nonprofits.66 The Acumen Fund is a
nonprofit venture fund that makes investments in
businesses in developing countries that promote social goods,

Hansmann, supra note 17, at 840–41. This raises the question
whether many other commercial nonprofits, such as nursing homes and
hospitals, should be viewed as social enterprises, especially those that do
not engage in development missions. The answer turns on whether or not
such organizations facilitate transactions with individuals that cannot
transact with commercial firms. For example, nursing homes and day care
centers that provide high quality services to affluent customers would not
count as social enterprises. However, hospitals and universities that
provide affordable services to low-income individuals would count.
65 The function of the non-distribution constraint was laid out in id.,
at 838. In addition, for a commercial firm, such as a bank or a bakery, to
qualify as a tax-exempt organization under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), it must serve
a charitable purpose, presumably by transacting with disadvantaged or
poor individuals.
66 CDFI COALITION, supra note 31.
64
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such as A to Z discussed above.67 VisionSpring, a low-cost
manufacturer and seller of affordable reading glasses,68 and
Aravind Eye Care System, a provider of low-cost eye care
services,69 are nonprofits.

B. Social Enterprises Versus Donative Organizations
Social enterprises need to be distinguished from donative
organizations. Donative organizations have been defined as
nonprofits that are funded primarily by donations.70 Oxfam
International, a nonprofit devoted to promoting development
and alleviating poverty, is a well-known example. This
Article uses the term “donative organization” to refer not
only to certain nonprofit corporations but also to government
agencies and multilateral organizations that allocate
subsidies to promote development. These organizations may
be viewed as nonprofits because they are effectively subject
to a non-distribution constraint; those who control the
organization are prohibited from appropriating its funds for
themselves. Moreover, they are essentially dependent on a
form of grant, i.e., an allocation of governmental funds.
USAID and the World Bank are two common examples of
such organizations.
There are two main elements that distinguish between
social enterprises and donative organizations. The first is
that the former are funded by earned income, whereas the
latter are funded by donations. As discussed above, social
enterprises, as subsidized commercial enterprises, may
receive donations or grants. The critical point, however, is
that the financial viability of social enterprises is primarily
See ACUMEN, http://acumen.org/ [https://perma.cc/L732-PDKM] (last
visited Mar. 17, 2017).
68 See VISIONSPRING, http://visionspring.org/ [https://perma.cc/7RW3JCVB] (last visited Mar. 17, 2017).
69 See
About
Us,
ARAVIND
EYE
CARE
SYSTEM,
http://www.aravind.org/Default/aboutuscontent/genesis
[https://perma.cc/373T-WAGQ] (last visited Mar. 17, 2017).
70 Hansmann, supra note 17, at 840.
67
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dependent on earned income rather than donations. The
second often overlooked element, which is central to the
theory in this Article, is that donative organizations are
engaged primarily in allocating subsidies to “external”
beneficiaries, i.e., beneficiaries who are not patrons of the
enterprise.71 Examples of subsidies to external beneficiaries
include distribution of goods (e.g., bed nets), subsidies
towards the purchase of goods or services (e.g., voucher
schemes or contribution of capital through credit subsidies),
and professional training programs. To be sure, many social
enterprises do allocate subsidies to their beneficiaries. MFIs
may provide subsidized rates to their borrowers, and FTSEs
may provide training subsidies to their farmers. However,
whereas donative organizations are engaged exclusively in
transferring subsidies to beneficiaries, social enterprises
require their patron-beneficiaries to provide a nontrivial
consideration (e.g., return of a loan with interest, or input
provided by farmers) that reflects their capital and resources
(e.g., ability to pay or productivity).
Finally, it should be emphasized that joint ventures or
other
contractual
arrangements
between
donative
organizations and for-profits may effectively create social
enterprises. In fact, these arrangements may underlie the
contractual and control mechanisms discussed above. First, a
donative organization may enter into a contract with a forprofit firm pursuant to which the former provides subsidies
and the latter commits to transacting with certain
beneficiaries. The for-profit essentially becomes a social
enterprise because of this contract. The agreement discussed
above between A to Z, a for-profit seller of bed nets, and a
partnership consisting of donative organizations is one

See infra Figure 2. Donative organizations may have a contract
with their beneficiaries that requires them to use subsidies for their
intended purpose (e.g., using medical supplies to treat patients). But, the
critical point is that the beneficiaries are not required to provide a
nontrivial consideration for the benefit received.
71
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example.72 Similarly, donative organizations often agree to
provide training subsidies and quality control to farmers in
developing countries if a for-profit firm—essentially an
FTSE—contractually commits to buying its supplies from
those producers.73
Second, control mechanisms often include a donative
organization that provides subsidized equity investment to
the social enterprise entity. One example is the Greyston
Foundation, the owner of the Greyston bakery. Its regular
activities concentrate on providing professional training to
external beneficiaries, i.e., the unemployed, but with respect
to the bakery, it operates like a social investment firm.74

FIGURE 2: DONATIVE ORGANIZATION

Beneficiaries

Donative
Organization

Donors/
Government

A donative organization is funded by subsidies in the form of donations
or grants, and it distributes those subsidies to its beneficiaries. A onesided light grey arrow is used to denote a subsidy.

See supra text accompanying notes 41–44.
See Aneel Karnani, Reducing Poverty through Employment,
I NNOVATIONS , Spring 2011, at 73, 82–86 (describing a partnership
between Technoserve and entrepreneurs to establish cashew nut plants in
Mozambique).
74 For instance, the bakery is the patron-beneficiary. See supra note
62 and accompanying text.
72
73
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C. Social Enterprises Versus Other Hybrid
Organizations
As stated above, a common form of hybrid organization
consists of corporations that engage in corporate charity and
corporate social responsibility (“CSR”). The major difference
between these organizations and social enterprises is that
they do not involve a commitment to transacting with
beneficiaries. In most cases, like donative organizations,
CSR policies involve the transfer of a subsidy to an external
beneficiary.75 Many corporations donate a portion of their
profits to charity. Often such donations are made to a
donative organization (for example, the Global Fund) that
channels them to external beneficiaries (e.g., people with
HIV in developing countries). CSR policies are largely
identical to corporate charity in economic terms, except that
CSR usually refers to a wider range of methods for passing
on subsidies. Google has vowed to use one percent of its
profits and its employees’ time to create solutions to global
problems, such as climate change and poverty alleviation.76
TABLE 1: GIVING VERSUS TRANSACTING
Giving

Transacting

For-profit

Corporate Charity

For-profit Social
Enterprise

Nonprofit

Donative
Organizations

Nonprofit Social
Enterprise

75 More difficult cases of CSR, where the subsidy is channeled to a
patron but there is no “true patron-beneficiary,” are discussed infra
Section VI.A.
76 See Reiser, supra note 10, at 2439.
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Accordingly, the key distinction drawn in this paper is
between organizations that provide charity through giving
subsidies and social enterprises that commit to transacting
with disadvantaged groups. The distinction between giving
and transacting transcends the traditional distinction
between for-profits and nonprofits. As shown in Table 1,
“giving” organizations include both donative organizations
and for-profit corporations that engage in charity, and as
shown above, social enterprises may be formed as for-profit
or nonprofits. The focus of this Article is to highlight the
advantages of social enterprises in utilizing subsidies to
promote development, although other forms of hybrid
organizations are discussed in more detail in Section VI.
Finally, not all firms fit neatly into a specific category.
Many social enterprises adopt corporate social responsibility
initiatives. Similarly, a donative organization may comprise
a social enterprise.77 Accordingly, the categories identified
herein should be considered as ideal types rather than
mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories.

III. A THEORY OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
The theory of social enterprise set out here explains how
the transactions with their patron-beneficiaries make social
enterprises relatively effective in addressing complex
development missions as compared to other forms of
organization. For this purpose, there is no need to draw
distinctions between social enterprises formed as for-profits
and those formed as nonprofits, as long as they are under a
commitment to transact with a class of disadvantaged
patrons. This Section will first consider the problems posed
by the use of subsidies and then will explain how the
measurement function of social enterprises can mitigate
these problems.

77 For
example, donative organizations that
programs may also employ disadvantaged workers.

operate

training
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A. The Limits of Subsidies
Standard economic theory is suspicious of subsidizing
corporations. There is a general concern that subsidies fail to
achieve their purpose and may be expropriated by those who
control the organization. In the case of donative
organizations, the non-distribution constraint mitigates the
possibility that managers will expropriate the subsidies (i.e.,
the donations). The non-distribution constraint on its own is
a relatively crude mechanism that works well especially
when donative organizations simply transfer subsidies to
beneficiaries (e.g., soup kitchens). However, in many cases,
the goal of subsidies is to address complex development
missions, such as increasing access to capital and improving
employment opportunities. It is unrealistic to expect the nondistribution constraint to assure donors that their subsidies
will be used effectively when the mission is highly complex.
While there may be many reasons why subsidies fail,
their ineffectiveness generally stems from information
asymmetries. Subsidies are transactions in which the
provider of the subsidy gives something of value (cash, goods
or a service) to a recipient, but may be unable to evaluate
how that subsidy was used at the time that the subsidy was
given. If a donor gives $100 to fund a training program for
low-income workers, there may be uncertainty as to whether
the training subsidy was effective in increasing employment.
Whether the training is effective depends on the attributes of
each beneficiary. The beneficiaries may already be
productive, and their unemployment is possibly due to other
economic factors. Alternatively, workers may lack very basic
skills (e.g., attentiveness), and therefore complicated
technical training may be inappropriate. An ineffective
subsidy is not simply a distribution of wealth but constitutes
waste, as the provider of the subsidy presumably intended it
to be utilized effectively.
Social enterprises are designed to deal with the
uncertainty of subsidies’ effectiveness when subsidies are
intended to address complex development missions, such as
increasing access to capital and enhancing productivity.
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Employing subsidies effectively to address such problems
requires differentiating among beneficiaries based on their
attributes, including creditworthiness, productivity, and
ability to pay. Such complex problems merit specific
attention. Consider a worker from a disadvantaged
community that suffers from systemic unemployment.
Rephrasing the issue, the problem is that such a worker
cannot find employment at a standard commercial firm.
Likewise, poor individuals cannot get loans from commercial
banks, small producers have difficulty selling their products
to multinational corporations, and individuals in rural
communities cannot buy essential products and services.
This inability of disadvantaged people to transact with
commercial firms may derive from two sources. The first is
that commercial firms have difficulty evaluating the abilities
of individuals that belong to disadvantaged groups. As a
result of such information asymmetries, commercial firms
fail to transact with them, even if such individuals have fully
competitive (“FC”) abilities to carry out their transactions
with the firm. A substantial body of research shows that
although many members of disadvantaged communities may
be too poor or lack technical skills, a significant number of
them have sufficient capabilities to transact with commercial
firms, for example, by buying products, repaying debt, or
working at a factory.78 While any commercial firm has to
deal with information asymmetries with respect to the
attributes of its patrons, e.g., workers’ skills or borrowers’
creditworthiness, there are various mechanisms to mitigate
these problems. For example, education helps workers signal
their abilities, and credit-rating bureaus collect information
on borrowers’ creditworthiness. Such mechanisms are often
absent in developing countries or low-income communities.
Moreover, the high proportion of individuals who lack FC
abilities in disadvantaged communities makes it harder for
commercial firms to identify those who have such abilities.
Consequently, when transacting with disadvantaged
78

See infra Part IV.
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individuals, firms may face a higher risk of transacting with
individuals with less than FC abilities.79 Transacting with
disadvantaged patrons therefore entails opportunity costs
(reflecting the opportunity to transact with patrons with
higher abilities), and hence leads commercial firms to ignore
them altogether.
Second, many disadvantaged individuals fall short of FC
abilities. Commercial firms would not transact with them
even if they could observe their abilities. The traditional
approach to dealing with this problem is for a donative
organization, a government agency, or a nonprofit to provide
them with some form of assistance—essentially a subsidy.
Such assistance may take several forms, for example,
distribution or subsidization of goods, credit subsidies, or
professional training programs. However, for such a subsidy
to be effective there must be information on the abilities of
its beneficiaries. An effective subsidy would only be allocated
to those who have below-competitive (“BC”) abilities, but who
could reach FC abilities if they received the subsidy. A
subsidy would be of limited effectiveness if it were allocated
to people who already have FC abilities or to individuals who
have no competitive (“NC”) abilities, i.e., individuals who are
unable to acquire FC abilities even if they received
assistance.80 For example, a training subsidy should be
administered only to workers who have some basic skills and

79 In general, firms can adjust their contracts to reflect the lower
abilities of disadvantaged patrons, for example, by reducing wages or
increasing interest rates to borrowers. But as wages fall or interest rates
increase, more capable patron-beneficiaries will exit the market, a process
that leads to rationing and often a collapse of the market. See Joseph E.
Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect
Information, 71 A M . E CON . R EV . 393, 393 (1981); see also ARMENDÁRIZ &
MORDUCH, supra note 16, at 29–56.
80 Of course, this categorization is somewhat crude, but it is
nonetheless helpful in elucidating the advantages of social enterprises.
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could perform at a fully competitive level if they received
professional training.81
The problem with donative organizations, however, is
that they have limited means for gathering information on
their beneficiaries’ attributes. By definition, there is no
transactional relationship between the organization and the
beneficiaries.82 A contractual transaction enables commercial
enterprises to elicit information about their patrons,
especially their abilities and preferences. It shows that
patrons have at least some capabilities to perform the
contract. For example, repayment of a debt or performance
as an employee reveals information on one’s abilities. By
contrast, because donative organizations do not transact
with their beneficiaries, they lack this information.83
If
donative
organizations
had
information
on
beneficiaries’ attributes, they would be able to allocate the
appropriate amount and type of subsidy. But, without such
information, there is a risk that they will prescribe wasteful
programs with limited effect84 that do not address the needs

To be sure, charitable transfers (e.g., cash or food stamps) to those
with NC abilities is desirable; the point is that at a very low ability level,
professional training would be a wasteful way of allocating subsidies to
such individuals.
82 See supra Figure 2.
83 Donative organizations could conduct impact studies of their
programs to address this problem. However, these studies are often
prohibitively costly. For example, following every worker that undergoes a
training program to record employment and performance requires paying
numerous staffers to both gather and interpret the information. Moreover,
it has been argued that donative organizations have only modest
incentives to carry out such studies because they may highlight to donors
the ineffectiveness of the organization’s programs. See Bertin Martens,
The Role of Evaluation in Foreign Aid Programmes, in T HE I NSTITUTIONAL
E CONOMICS OF F OREIGN A ID 154, 170 (Bertin Martens et al. eds., 2002).
84 There is ample literature on the disappointing effectiveness of aid
provided by government agencies or international organizations. See id.,
at 155; William Easterly, Can the West Save Africa?, 47 J. E CON .
L ITERATURE 373, 438–39 (2009); William Easterly, Was Development
Assistance a Mistake?, 97 A M . E CON . R EV ., 328, 330 (2007); Claudia R.
81
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and attributes of their beneficiaries. The waste in this case
includes the costs of the subsidy (e.g., the cost of the
training) given to those with FC abilities (as they do not
need any training) and to those with NC abilities (for whom
training would be useless).85 The additional social costs
include the waste from training those with BC abilities
effectively who nonetheless fail to obtain employment with
firms that choose to ignore disadvantaged individuals
anyway. Accordingly, subsidies tend to be wasteful when
there is a high proportion of individuals with FC or NC
abilities or if commercial firms ignore disadvantaged groups
anyway.

B. The Measurement Role of Social Enterprises
The thrust of the theory described in this Article is that
transacting with their beneficiaries gives social enterprises
the tools and incentives to utilize subsidies effectively. Social
enterprises perform a measurement function with respect to
the attributes of their beneficiaries. Unlike donative
organizations, social enterprises are committed to
transacting with their beneficiaries as patrons.86 The
commitment device ensures that they cannot transact with
other more capable patrons, for example, more productive
workers
from
high-income
communities.87
Because
transacting with disadvantaged patrons entails opportunity
costs, social enterprises must receive some subsidies.
Williamson, Exploring the Failure of Foreign Aid: The Role of Incentives
and Information, 23 R EV . A USTRIAN E CON . 17, 27–31 (2010).
85 Without information, the rational strategy is to provide the same
subsidy to all beneficiaries in the same amount that would help those who
have BC abilities attain FC abilities. The reason is that disbursals in any
other amount and type will always be inefficient, whereas such disbursals
may at least be efficient with respect to beneficiaries that have BC
abilities.
86 Compare supra Figure 1 with supra Figure 2.
87 The form of commitment device adopted by the social enterprise is
of limited relevance for present purposes. For a discussion of choice of
commitment devices and organizational form, see infra Part V.
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However, as explained above, social enterprises must still
earn revenues to remain financially viable.88 For social
enterprises to earn revenues, the patron-beneficiaries must
be able to perform their tasks and duties under their
transactions with the social enterprise firm at a reasonable
level: a WISE would suffer financially if its workers were not
competent; an MFI must ensure that its borrowers are
sufficiently creditworthy; if the quality of input is low,
FTSEs will not be able to sell their products; and for a lowcost seller to be commercially viable, its consumers must be
able to purchase the products or services it offers.
Consequently, social enterprises have the tools and the
incentives to measure their beneficiaries’ abilities to make
sure that they have at least FC or BC abilities.89 For
example, as discussed below, WISEs closely evaluate the
productivity and performance of their worker-beneficiaries.
Social enterprises use the information on their patronbeneficiaries to tailor the amount and type of subsidies to
their specific needs. If the subsidies transferred to
beneficiaries are excessive, the social enterprise will be less
profitable. If the subsidy is insufficient or inadequate, the
patron-beneficiaries may not perform well, and again the
business will suffer. For example, a WISE will employ those
with FC abilities, but has no need to allocate them a training
subsidy. It will then allocate a subsidy only to those who
have BC abilities. In particular, given its contractual
88 An example is a social enterprise that employs disadvantaged
workers and makes a 10% annual return on a $1 million investment, while
a profit-maximizing firm would make a 30% annual return on the same
investment; the subsidy is the 20% annual return that investors are
willing to forgo. It is noteworthy that a social enterprise may also make
negative returns on invested capital as long as it also receives additional
subsidies to ensure that the firm remains solvent—for example, where the
return on investment is -10% and the firm receives a government grant to
cover accounting losses. Even in this case, the firm needs to earn
substantial revenues to be viable.
89 Depending on the business model, some social enterprises transact
only with individuals who have FC abilities, whereas others transact also
with those who have BC abilities.
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relationship with its worker-beneficiaries, a WISE is able to
ensure that workers with BC abilities are actually
productive and that the training program is indeed adapted
to the commercial needs of the firm.90 Note also that there
are welfare gains to patron-beneficiaries with FC or BC
abilities who would not otherwise be able to transact with
commercial firms.91 Contrast this with a donative
organization
that
allocates
wasteful
subsidies
to
beneficiaries with FC and NC abilities, and has no practical
way to ensure that its beneficiaries are actually employed.
Accordingly, the use of social enterprises results in more
effective deployment of subsidies.
In this way, the commitment to transacting with a
disadvantaged group effectively aligns the profit and social
missions of social enterprises.92 More specifically, it aligns
the interests of the subsidy providers with the profit interest
of those who control the social enterprise, i.e., the owners in
the case of for-profit social enterprises93 or the managers in
the case of nonprofit social enterprises who presumably want
to maximize spending on perquisites.94 In order for social

90 A social enterprise will sever its transactions with those who have
NC abilities as they are unable to perform the job, but these individuals
may still seek relief from a donative organization. See J.P. MORGAN GLOB.
RESEARCH & THE ROCKEFELLER FOUND., supra note 3, at 45 (noting that a
portion of the population with the lowest income levels will remain reliant
on aid).
91 These welfare gains are equal to the economic surplus they derive
from their transactional relationship with the social enterprise.
92 Note that this is subject to the risk of mission-drift discussed infra
Section VII.A.
93 When a for-profit social enterprise adopts a control mechanism as a
commitment device, the owners may be nonprofits that provide subsidies
to the social enterprise. Nonetheless, even such nonprofit owners have a
profit motive to increase their income, so that they have more funds to
apply towards their social missions.
94 In line with the model of nonprofits offered by Glaeser & Shleifer,
supra note 19, managers of nonprofits want to increase profits because
they can extract a proportion of such profits in the form of higher salaries
and perks.
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enterprises (for-profits or nonprofits) to remain financially
viable, they must ensure that their patron-beneficiaries
perform well and that subsidies are not wasted. Thus, the
incentives of social enterprises to allocate subsidies
effectively are present even if, and in fact in large part
because, the owners and/or managers are motivated by
profit. The same incentives exist when the owners and/or
managers are altruistic, because even an altruistic owner or
manager does not derive utility from wasting subsidies and
must make sure that the business is viable for it to achieve
its development mission.
Social enterprises employ three primary mechanisms to
measure their beneficiaries’ attributes: (1) Due diligence:
Social enterprises study the attributes of their beneficiaries
before entering into a contract with them in order to decide
whether or not to transact. (2) Intensive monitoring: In
the course of transacting with the beneficiaries, the social
enterprise monitors their performance, thereby acquiring
information on their abilities. This information is used to
make two decisions: whether to continue the contractual
relationship and what type of subsidies should be allocated
to the beneficiaries. (3) Incentive mechanisms: Social
enterprises may utilize the relationship with the patronbeneficiaries as the basis for developing incentive
mechanisms to reveal information on patron-beneficiaries’
abilities and efforts. To be eligible for a subsidy, beneficiaries
with BC abilities must reveal their abilities to perform the
contract; if they were to represent themselves as having NC
abilities, they would not be able to transact with the social
enterprise. While those with FC abilities may have an
incentive to pretend they have BC abilities so that they may
qualify for certain subsidies (e.g., longer grace periods on
loans), the contract may provide for various mechanisms to
mitigate their incentives to understate their abilities (e.g., a
promise of a future loan on better terms if they timely repay
a loan, thereby revealing their FC abilities).
To be sure, these mechanisms are not conceptually
different from those used in contracts between standard
commercial firms and their patrons. The main difference is
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that employing these mechanisms with respect to
disadvantaged persons is more costly than with respect to
non-disadvantaged ones and may require social enterprises
to develop specialized techniques to measure the attributes
of disadvantaged individuals; hence, the need for a subsidy.
For example, doing diligence in rural markets on the
creditworthiness or ability to pay of low-income people may
be extremely costly; intensive monitoring of workers with
different ability levels requires a great deal of effort on the
part of managers. Additionally, as shown below, incentive
mechanisms used by social enterprises can be highly
specialized and entail high transaction costs.
It follows that the primary role of subsidies is not to fund
direct allocations to beneficiaries via discounted prices or
rates. As shown above, many social enterprises do not make
any such allocation. Compartamos, for example, may be
viewed as transacting exclusively with poor borrowers who
have high, presumably FC abilities, charging them rates that
reflect their creditworthiness. The primary role of the
subsidies is to fund the costs associated with transacting
with patron-beneficiaries, especially the costs of measuring
or evaluating beneficiaries’ attributes. In this respect, social
enterprises also have incentives to economize on the costs of
measurement by employing a variety of creative
mechanisms. As shown below, many social enterprises have
developed efficient mechanisms for measuring their patronbeneficiaries’ attributes through diligence, monitoring, and
incentive mechanisms.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that social
enterprises only have efficiency advantages over donative
organizations when there are information asymmetries with
respect to beneficiaries’ attributes. When there are no
information asymmetries, a donative organization is equally
effective in allocating subsidies. The most conspicuous
example is distribution of food aid in the midst of a natural
crisis, such as an earthquake. There is relatively little risk
that such aid will be employed ineffectively. Likewise, if
there is available information on beneficiaries’ abilities to
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pay or skill level, donative organizations could simply tailor
subsidies to their needs.
The measurement role of social enterprise is thus
essential only when it is necessary to differentiate among
beneficiaries. Evaluating the abilities of different types of
beneficiaries is critical in the context of development goals,
such as enhancing access to capital or increasing
productivity. Allocating subsidies to facilitate development
requires screening creditworthy borrowers from risky ones,
differentiating between productive workers and those who
lack basic skills, and evaluating the ability of consumers to
pay for products and services. Social enterprises have the
ability and incentives to gather this information and, as a
result, are likely to use subsidies effectively.

IV. APPLICATION OF THE THEORY
This Section applies the theory to various forms of social
enterprise. The discussion is divided into different types of
development goals. With respect to such goals, this Section
describes how information problems preclude standard
commercial firms from transacting with disadvantaged
groups, explains why donative organizations fail to assist
them, and shows how social enterprises use their
measurement role to address the problem.

A. Access to Capital: Microfinance Institutions, Credit
Development Financial Institutions and Social
Investment Firms
(1) Commercial Firms: Commercial banks have
traditionally avoided transacting with poor individuals in
low-income communities in both developing and developed
countries. Commercial lenders rely on credit scores to
evaluate their borrowers. They also require collateral or
other security to mitigate the risk of default. In low-income
communities, credit scores are usually not available, as
borrowers lack credit history, employment track record, and,
in some cases, even proof of identity. In addition, poor
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borrowers usually lack collateral to pledge as security for a
loan.95 Moreover, the presence of many risky borrowers who
have limited earning capacity makes it harder for banks to
identify those who can repay their debts. Likewise,
investment firms tend to ignore small businesses, especially
in developing countries.96 In developed markets, investment
firms, such as private equity firms, rely on audited financial
information, the track record and reputation of their
investees’ management, and general market information. By
contrast, in developing markets, the balance sheet of
businesses may not be a reliable source of information, as
financial standards either do not exist or are not enforced,
and, more generally, data on the relevant market may be
scarce. Moreover, evaluating the potential of a small
business with no track record can be difficult.
(2) Donative Organizations: Many low-income
individuals or small businesses cannot pay commercial rates
for loans or generate commercial returns. Governments of
developing countries have for many years subsidized credit
in an attempt to increase access to capital, especially for
small farmers. These subsidies have taken different forms, in
particular, the allocation of cheap loans through credit
subsidies. However, credit subsidies in whatever form have
been grossly inefficient.97 Repayment rates in such programs
have been very low, with default rates ranging from forty to
ninety-five percent.98 Impact studies have attributed low

95 See
C REDIT R EPORTING S YSTEMS AND THE I NTERNATIONAL
E CONOMY (Margaret J. Miller ed., 2003).
96 See H ELMS , supra note 16, at 2–5; PRAHALAD, supra note 41, at 32;
Benjamin et al., supra note 31, at 177–79.
97 ARMENDÁRIZ & MORDUCH, supra note 16, at 9–12; see generally
U NDERMINING R URAL D EVELOPMENT WITH C HEAP C REDIT (Dale W.
Adams et al. eds., 1984); Avishay Braverman & J. Luis Guasch, Rural
Credit Markets and Institutions in Developing Countries: Lessons for
Policy Analysis from Practice and Modern Theory, 14 W ORLD D EV . 1253
(1986); Juan J. Buttari, Subsidized Credit Programs: The Theory, the
Record, the Alternatives (USAID Evaluation Special Study No. 75, 1995).
98 ARMENDÁRIZ & MORDUCH, supra note 16, at 9–10.
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repayment rates in large part to information problems.
Examples include inadequate program design that wrongly
assumed that borrowers, mainly farmers, necessarily had
good projects, uncertainty regarding the ability of borrowers
to meet payment obligations, and failures to monitor
borrowers who often diverted loan funds to other purposes,
including consumption.99 Moreover, many borrowers lacked
knowledge and inputs, and therefore their projects were
likely to fail. Accordingly, these subsidized programs were
often wasteful and their costs swamped the modest benefits
that they generated.
(3) Social Enterprises: MFIs, CDFIs, and social
investment firms tailor the terms of their investments to the
creditworthiness and business potential of their investees.
Compartamos charges market rates on its loans to the
moderately poor. Thus, it does not directly allocate subsidies
to its beneficiaries; rather, it utilizes the subsidies it has
received to measure its beneficiaries’ creditworthiness. As a
result of such measurement, default rates tend to be very
low, despite the high interest rates charged to borrowers.100
Simply transferring credit subsidies to borrowers in
circumstances when they can afford to take out a commercial
loan or, even worse, when they have no viable projects is
clearly an inferior solution. On the other hand, MFIs, CDFIs
and social investment firms that transact with less capable
individuals provide them with different types of subsidies.
For example, MFIs, such as ASA, BRAC and Grameen Bank,
provide their borrowers with reduced rates and business
training.101 Similarly, while some social investment funds
99 See Braverman & Guasch, supra note 97, at 1257; Buttari, supra
note 97.
100 Default rates for Compartamos were historically less than 1%,
whereas the average default rate on consumer loans by other Mexican
banks was 4.4%. See COMPARTAMOS OFFERING CIRCULAR, supra note 26, at
83.
101 See ARMENDÁRIZ & MORDUCH, supra note 16, at 325–39; BRAC,
2015
ANNUAL
REPORT
22
(2016),
http://www.brac.net/images/reports/BRAC-Bangladesh-Report-2015.pdf
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seek to make near-competitive returns,102 others, such as
Triodos Bank and the Acumen Fund, charge below-market
rates and provide business training to their investees.103
Thus, the prices and subsidies are adjusted to the
beneficiaries’ abilities.
The effectiveness of subsidies channeled through social
enterprises is evidenced by their self-sustainability. When
borrowers of MFIs and CDFIs pay back their loans, and
investees of social investment firms generate reasonable
returns, this indicates that the subsidies are effective, as the
patron-beneficiaries are performing well. In particular,
measurement of borrowers has been particularly successful
for MFIs whose loan repayment rates tend to be very high.104
As discussed above, social enterprises use three primary
mechanisms to measure their beneficiaries:
(i) Due diligence: CDFIs use alternative mechanisms to
collect information on the creditworthiness of low-income
borrowers, such as utility bills, house visits, and personal
interaction with borrowers.105 To reduce the costs of
[https://perma.cc/CD53-2M27]; Ruhul Amin & Rashidul Islam Sheikh, The
Impact of Micro-Finance Program on the Poor: A Comparative Study of
Grameen Bank, BRAC and ASA in Some Selected Areas in Bangladesh, 3
EUR. J. BUS. & MGMT. 346 (2011). Note that the rates charged by
microfinance institutions are higher than average commercial rates
because of the risk associated with lending to the poor; the key point
however is that their lending rates are lower than those that commercial
firms would require if they made loans to disadvantaged individuals.
102 For example, the IGNIA Fund, discussed infra Section V.C.
103 See MOSES LEE, ACUMEN FUND: HOW TO MAKE THE GREATEST
IMPACT (2007), http://acumen.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/1428592acumen-fund-donotcopy.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8X5-X9JB]; TRIODOS BANK
ANNUAL REPORT 2015, supra note 38.
104 There is mixed data on delinquency rates of CDFIs’ loans, though
they generally appear to be comparable to industry averages. See MICHAEL
SWACK ET AL., CARSEY INSTITUTE, CDFI INDUSTRY ANALYSIS: SUMMARY
REPORT (2012).
105 Lindsey Appleyard, Community Development Finance Institution
(CDFIs): Geographies of Financial Inclusion in the US and UK, 42
GEOFORUM 250, 255 (2011); KATY JACOB, THE CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS.
INNOVATION, REACHING DEEPER: USING ALTERNATIVE DATA SOURCES TO
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information, they also tend to specialize in specific
industries, such as housing finance.106 Social investment
firms invest effort and resources in due diligence, including
vetting the character and qualifications of the management
team and financial analysis of their investees.107 By contrast,
MFIs that make very small loans to borrowers tend to
conduct a less onerous diligence process and rely more
extensively on other mechanisms.
(ii) Intensive monitoring: MFIs as well as CDFIs evaluate
the performance of their borrowers for the duration of their
loans, and over time they accumulate data on borrowers’
business projects and repayment rates. MFIs use frequent
repayment installments of very small amounts in order to
allow their credit officers an early opportunity to assess
borrowers’ performance.108 Repayment of the loan on time is
a clear indication of a borrower’s abilities, and she may then
be given additional loans. At some stage, it may become
evident that borrowers no longer need a subsidy. They then
may obtain loans at commercial rates; for example, the
interest rates may be lowered and the loan size increased,
not as a disbursal to the borrower, but to reflect the lower
risk of lending to a borrower with higher abilities. On the
other hand, if borrowers default, they receive no additional

INCREASE THE EFFICACY OF CREDIT SCORING, https://s3.amazonaws.com/cfsiinnovation-files/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/14031138/2006-03-ReachingDeeper-Using-Alternative-Data-Sources-to-Increase-the-Efficacy-of-CreditScoring.pdf [https://perma.cc/X279-MK2P] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
106 See Ronald Grzywinski, The New Old-Fashioned Banking, H ARV .
B US . R EV ., May–June 1991, at 87, 93; Michael Klausner, Market Failure
and Community Investment: A Market-Oriented Alternative to the
Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. P A . L. R EV . 1561, 1578–79 (1995).
107 See J.P. MORGAN GLOB. RESEARCH & THE ROCKEFELLER FOUND.,
supra note 3, at 70. For a useful illustration of the process, see WILLIAM
DAVIDSON INSTITUTE, ACUMEN FUND: VALUING A SOCIAL VENTURE (A) (2009);
WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE, ACUMEN FUND: VALUING A SOCIAL VENTURE
(B) (2009).
108 See ARMENDÁRIZ & MORDUCH, supra note 16, at 145–53.
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loans.109 Through this process, MFIs and CDFIs have
compiled a sizeable database on the creditworthiness of their
target markets. Although social investment firms tend to
rely more on diligence, they also exercise substantial
monitoring over their investees. The monitoring may consist
of appointing directors to the board of the investee and
requiring board consent for certain business decisions,
including not only major transactions, such as mergers, but
also managerial decisions regarding business strategy.110
(iii) Incentive mechanisms: Many MFIs rely on a
specialized incentive mechanism known as group lending.
The gist of it is that loans are made to a group of borrowers
who are jointly liable for the debts of each other borrower in
the group.111 Group lending gives rise to a process of
assortative matching whereby safe (risky) borrowers form
groups with other safe (risky) borrowers. The risky
borrowers are effectively charged higher rates than the safe
ones because their groups default more often. In this way,
group lending generates information on borrowers’ abilities
before a loan is made. Group lending also reduces moral
hazard ex post a loan contract, as group members monitor
each other to make sure they repay their loans, and failure
to pay results in social stigma.112 Group lending has been
often associated with very high repayment rates of over 90%.
Despite its apparent effectiveness, many MFIs are gradually
shifting away from group lending to more standard
mechanisms, mainly because conducting group meetings

109 For example, South Shore Bank, a known CDFI, experimented
with loans to small businesses that suffered from high default rates before
it started focusing on housing finance. See Grzywinski, supra note 106, at
93.
110 See, e.g., WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE, ACUMEN FUND: VALUING A
SOCIAL
VENTURE
(A),
supra
note
107,
at
21
–24.
111 For a detailed explanation, see ARMENDÁRIZ & MORDUCH, supra
note 16, at 97–98.
112 Id. at 157.
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involves high transaction and social costs.113 In particular,
MFIs promise borrowers an opportunity to borrow more
capital on better terms if they repay their existing loans on
time.114 Thus, loans may be made for larger amounts, longer
terms, and at better interest rates. This addresses the risk
that borrowers will not pay once project returns have been
realized.

B. Improving Productivity: Fair Trade Social
Enterprises
(1) Commercial firms: Multinational corporations buy
their inputs from well-established commercial producers or
middlemen and avoid buying inputs directly from small
producers.115 The major concern of commercial firms is the
quality of products supplied by small producers. In a
fragmented market of numerous suppliers, and with respect
to products the quality of which is not observable by cursory
inspection, it is too costly to evaluate each item of input.
Coffee beans and bananas are two notable examples.116
Nitin Bhatt & Shui-Yan Tang, The Problem of Transaction Costs in
Group-Based Microlending: An Institutional Perspective, 26 W ORLD D EV .
623 (1998).
114 ARMENDÁRIZ & MORDUCH, supra note 16, at 140, 143.
115 Small producers sell their products to middlemen known as
“coyotes” who are often in a position to exploit their monopsonist power.
Thus, a common explanation for fair trade is that it is a solution to
monopsonist pricing. See NICHOLLS & OPAL, supra note 45, at 33–34; Mark
Hayes, On the Efficiency of Fair Trade, 64 R EV . S OC . E CON . 447 (2006).
This view ignores a more fundamental question, which is why there is no
competition in the first place. If multinational corporations traded directly
with small producers, competition for the products of small producers
would raise prices. The problem is that information asymmetries preclude
direct trading between corporations and small producers. This problem is
similar to the problem of monopolist moneylenders with respect to lending
to poor borrowers. When commercial lenders refrain from lending to the
poor because of information problems, monopolist moneylenders may step
in and lend at exploitative rates. See ARMENDÁRIZ & MORDUCH, supra note
16, at 31–33.
116 See NICHOLLS & OPAL, supra note 45, at 81, 87.
113

ELDAR – FINAL

No. 1:92]

SOCIAL ENTERPRISE & HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS

139

There is great difficulty in distinguishing among producers
with different ability levels, especially as many small
producers in developing countries do not meet the quality
standards of export markets.117 It is also costly to monitor
small producers to ensure that they exert a sufficient level of
effort. Small producers may try to establish a reputation for
high quality by using marketing tools, but with few
exceptions, they tend to be too segregated or too poor to
establish a brand. Accordingly, many producers, especially
farmers, in developing countries have difficulties selling
their products to multinational corporations even if they can
meet high quality standards.
(2) Donative Organizations: Many farmers lack
training with respect to quality standards, production
methodologies, and organizational skills.118 Donative
organizations may provide them with assistance in the form
of subsidized input, such as fertilizer, professional training,
and technical assistance. Subsidizing fertilizers to enhance
farm productivity has a longstanding history in attempts to
jumpstart African agriculture.119 These programs, however,
were found to have high costs and questionable benefits. In
particular, programs have suffered from a variety of
problems, including little actual use of fertilizers by farmers,
lack of information on the benefits of fertilizers and how to
properly use them, excessive use that may in fact reduce
yields, delivery after the optimal fertilization period, and
lack of complementary measures (e.g., quality inputs).120
See id. at 35–36.
See D EAN K ARLAN & J ACOB A PPEL , M ORE THAN G OOD
I NTENTIONS : H OW A N EW E CONOMICS IS H ELPING TO S OLVE G LOBAL
P OVERTY 168 (2011); NICHOLLS & OPAL, supra note 45, at 34–39.
119 Easterly, Can the West Save Africa?, supra note 84, at 416;
MICHAEL MORRIS ET AL., THE WORLD BANK, FERTILIZER USE IN AFRICAN
AGRICULTURE: LESSONS LEARNED AND GOOD PRACTICE GUIDELINES (2007),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/498591468204546593/pdf/3903
70AFR0Fert101OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7VJGCC55].
120 MORRIS ET AL., supra note 119, at 31–44.
117
118

ELDAR – FINAL

140

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2017

Although yields do seem to increase following subsidization
or distribution,121 there is a consensus that these programs
tend to be inefficient. The record of training programs,
known as agricultural extension, has been even more dismal.
Agricultural training requires dealing with individual
farmers, and each farmer’s needs are different.122 Among
other problems, training programs have been found to suffer
from lack of information as to farmers’ abilities and needs,
difficulties in attributing impact to training efforts, little
effort to learn from experience, and limited incentives to
provide quality information to farmers.123 Moreover, given
the difficulty of attributing outcomes, program staff tends to
focus excessively on reporting input indicators, such as visits
made, rather than material impact.124 There is also evidence
that the training is only useful to farmers with higher
skills,125 though it is presumably administered to all farmers
in a given community.
(3) Social Enterprises: FTSEs have a clear advantage
in adjusting their subsidies to the attributes of their
producers. Cafédirect’s business development programs,
which include building capabilities in marketing, quality
control, and crop management, are tailored to producers’
Esther Duflo et al., How High Are Rates of Return to Fertilizer?
Evidence from Field Experiments in Kenya?, 98 A M . E CON . R EV .: P APERS
& P ROC . 482, 482 (2008).
122 Easterly, Can the West Save Africa?, supra note 84, at 419.
123 See Jock R. Anderson & Gershon Feder, Agricultural Extension:
Good Intentions and Hard Realities, 19 W ORLD B ANK R ES . O BSERVER 41,
55 (2004); Jock R. Anderson et al., The Rise and Fall of Training and Visit
Extension: An Asian Mini-drama with an African Epilogue (World Bank
Pol’y
Res.
Working
Paper
3928,
2006),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=917499
[https://perma.cc/ DQ4Q-UEJ5]; WORLD BANK INDEP. EVALUATION GRP.,
WORLD BANK ASSISTANCE TO AGRICULTURE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 44, 54–
56
(2007),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org
EXTASSAGRISUBSAHAFR/Resources/ag_africa_eval.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F5K4-5VF7].
124 Anderson et al., supra note 123 at 6.
125 Id. at 5.
121
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specific needs.126 FTSEs have incentives to subsidize
fertilizers and high-quality input to the extent that small
farmers cannot afford to purchase them, as well as to teach
farmers how to use them effectively. The effectiveness of
their training and fertilizer subsidies is simply evidenced by
their financial sustainability. The profitability of Cafédirect
is itself an indication that the quality of the product is high
and that the subsidies it allocates to its producers are
sufficient to enable them to reach fully competitive abilities.
FTSEs measure their beneficiaries’ attributes in the
following ways:
(i) Due diligence: FTSEs invest in studying the
capabilities of producers. They send expeditions to
developing countries to visit producers in order to sample the
quality of their products. Often a donative organization will
partner with a FTSE and assist with sampling and
training.127
(ii) Intensive monitoring: FTSEs typically sell highquality products, mainly to address concerns that the poor
cannot produce quality products.128 Therefore, they naturally
need to monitor the quality of the input they buy from
producers. Although their relationship with their producerbeneficiaries is generally expected to be long-term (as
discussed below), there is no commitment to transacting with
producers who turn out to be unable to perform. FTSEs learn
which producers are more capable than others, as the quality
of the input affects the quality of the end product. If
consumers buy the product, this is an indication of its high
quality, and vice versa.

CAFÉDIRECT, supra note 52, at 3.
See Karnani, supra note 73. For examples of cooperation by
Starbucks with various donative organizations, see JAMES E. AUSTIN &
CATE REAVIS, STARBUCKS AND CONSERVATION INTERNATIONAL 12 (2004)
(Harv. Bus. Sch. Case 9-303-055); Paul A. Argenti, Collaborating with
Activists: How Starbucks Works with NGOs, 47 C AL . M GMT . R EV . 91, 108–
10 (2004).
128 NICHOLLS & OPAL, supra note 45, at 24.
126
127
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(iii) Incentive mechanisms: First, the Fair Trade
standards require small producers to be members of
cooperatives, an arrangement under which producermembers have equity ownership proportional to the quantity
of product they sell through the cooperative.129 The function
of the cooperative, other than to enable producers to pool
resources and capital, is to address information
asymmetries. The formation of cooperatives leads to
assortative matching among producers, like group lending in
the case of MFIs. Producers with sufficiently high
capabilities will partner with producers with similar
capabilities in order to ensure that their cooperative will
supply products of sufficient quality, so that FTSEs continue
to transact with them. Once the cooperative starts
transacting, producers have incentives to monitor each other
to ensure that each of them supplies high-quality input in a
timely fashion.
Second, Fair Trade standards contain requirements that
enhance producers’ incentives to invest in the quality of their
products by insuring producers against risks outside their
control. FTSEs are expected to transact with small producers
on a long-term basis,130 and importers that cut off small
producers without good reason are likely to face reputational
costs. Moreover, importers must pay either the market price
or floor price of a commodity, whichever is higher, and must
pre-finance up to 60% of orders.131 The reason for this is not
only to transfer wealth to the producers; rather, the primary
reason is that producers, who lack access to credit and
insurance products, may have to cut costs at the expense of
quality if they are subject to unexpected adverse shocks.
Income smoothing and price insurance assure producers that
they will not face short-term capital constraints or severe

129 See FAIRTRADE STANDARD FOR SMALL PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONS,
supra note 50, § 4.2.
130 See id. § 4.
131 FAIRTRADE
STANDARD FOR COFFEE FOR SMALL PRODUCER
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 51, § 4.2.
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loss as a result of a sharp decline in commodity prices or a
drought. When given a price that reflects their efforts and
the promise, albeit informal, of future transactions if they
perform well, producers have stronger incentives to invest in
quality.

C. Employment Opportunities: Work Integration
Social Enterprises
(1) Commercial firms: Low-income individuals and
other disadvantaged groups, such as disabled persons or
people with a criminal record, tend to suffer from systemic
unemployment.132 The reason for this appears to be the costs
associated with evaluating their abilities. In any hiring
decision, commercial firms face asymmetric information with
respect to workers’ abilities. In developed labor markets,
workers typically use their educational and professional
qualifications, job referrals, and even their social
backgrounds to signal their abilities to prospective
employers. Such signaling mechanisms are particularly
important in the case of low-skill jobs where employers care
primarily about soft skills, such as discipline and
attentiveness, which are difficult to observe prior to hiring.
Poor workers in disadvantaged communities tend to lack
access to education and have little or no employment track
record.133 Moreover, the presence of a large number of
workers with low skills makes it even harder for firms to
identify those who have sufficient abilities. In these
circumstances, firms often assume that all workers who
belong to a disadvantaged group are unlikely to be capable
workers.

See T IMOTHY J. B ARTIK , J OBS F OR THE P OOR : C AN L ABOR D EMAND
P OLICIES H ELP ?, 55–58 (2001).
133 Id. at 57; Giulia Galera, Social Enterprises and the Integration of
Disadvantaged Workers, in T HE E CONOMICS OF S OCIAL R ESPONSIBILITY :
T HE W ORLD OF S OCIAL E NTERPRISES , 105, 106–07 (Leonardo Becchetti &
Carlo Borzaga eds., 2011).
132
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(2) Donative Organizations: When workers lack
sufficient capabilities, donative organizations may provide
them with training with the goal of integrating unemployed
and economically disadvantaged workers into the workforce.
Many studies, however, show that the effectiveness of
training programs tends to be partial at best. The benefits to
participants in terms of earnings and employment are
modest and do not persist over time.134 Interestingly, many
studies suggest that the least able participants among the
low-skilled populations benefit the least from them.135 This
indicates that many programs are wasteful in the sense that
training is provided to those whose abilities may be too low.
In addition, training programs have been criticized for
failing to meet the needs of commercial businesses.136 Thus,
the evidence as a whole suggests that training programs
have limited effectiveness.
(3) Social Enterprises: WISEs have a clear advantage
in adjusting training programs to the skill level of their
beneficiaries and the particular needs of the business. The
Greyston Bakery conducts multiple training sessions
designed specifically to enhance the performance of its
workers. The bakery’s profitability is itself an indication that
the subsidies are effective in helping its workers reach a
134 See James J. Heckman et al., The Economics and Econometrics of
Active Labor Market Programs, in 3A H ANDBOOK OF L ABOR E CONOMICS
1865, 2050–54 (Orley C. Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999); BARTIK,
supra note 132, at 88–110; WORLD BANK INDEP. EVALUATION GRP., USING
TRAINING TO BUILD CAPACITY FOR DEVELOPMENT: AN EVALUATION OF THE
WORLD BANK’S PROJECT-BASED AND WBI TRAINING 36–38 (2008),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTTRABUICAPDEV/Resources/full_d
oc.pdf [https://perma.cc/WN8W-UJLU] [hereinafter IEG, USING TRAINING
TO BUILD CAPACITY].
135 Heckman et al., supra note 134, at 2060–64.
136 See BARTIK, supra note 132; IEG, USING TRAINING TO BUILD
CAPACITY, supra note 134, at 36–38; John P. Martin & David Grubb, What
Works and for Whom: A Review of OECD Countries’ Experiences with
Active Labour Market Policies 15 (OECD Working Paper 2001:14),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=348621
[https://perma.cc/8EWZ-NJTJ].
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competitive level. Again, there are three ways in which
WISEs gather information:
(i) Due diligence: Many WISEs, like any business, conduct
diligence ex ante hiring decisions. WISEs may rely on
referrals from training agencies, nonprofits, or welfare
departments, and some conduct rigorous screening of
referrals through interviews and tests.137 The Greyston
Bakery, on the other hand, does not conduct any diligence ex
ante hiring; rather, it relies on intensive monitoring and
incentive mechanisms ex post hiring.
(ii) Intensive monitoring: The Greyston Bakery hires
workers on a “no questions asked” basis. At this stage it has
limited information on its newly hired employees, who may
have different levels of ability.138 The management then
monitors their performance and gathers information on their
abilities, especially their attitude, punctuality, and
productivity. After one year’s apprenticeship, during which
they are evaluated on a biweekly basis, they may be hired as
full-time employees. In the course of their employment they
receive ongoing professional development training, which
includes intensive bi-weekly performance evaluations. By
contrast, such intensive monitoring is not necessary in
standard commercial bakeries, because workers tend to have
higher abilities. Over time, the firm gathers information on
employees. Workers who perform well may be promoted to
better positions or move to working for higher salaries at
commercial firms. On the other hand, workers who fail to
meet certain minimum standards are laid off. The average
turnover rate at Greyston is relatively high and entails high
costs for the firm.
(iii) Incentive mechanisms: As mentioned above, the
workers of the Greyston Bakery who perform adequately
may be hired as full-time employees after a year’s
apprenticeship and may later be promoted to better

137
138

BARTIK, supra note 132, at 219.
Barker et al., Open Hiring Policy, supra note 58, at 1.
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positions, including managerial ones.139 In addition, the
bakery provides positive reinforcement to its employees,
including a monthly award of distinction.140 Workers thus
have incentives to reveal their true abilities. Workers have
little incentive to understate their abilities because they may
either lose their jobs or forgo opportunities to gain awards,
promotions, or better salaries.

D. Enhancing Consumer Welfare: Low-Cost Retailers
and Service Providers
(1) Commercial firms: Although multinationals are
increasingly penetrating emerging markets, many rural
markets remain underserved.141 Consequently, many
essential products and services are often lacking in such
markets. Examples include eyeglasses, health services,
water purifiers, and bed nets. Many poor customers in
developing markets actually have substantial purchasing
power.142 In mature developed markets, commercial firms
may produce affordable products designed specifically for low
to moderate-income customers at a profit. The growth of lowcost retailers and food chains, such as Walmart and
McDonalds, is a pertinent example. In rural markets,
however, the problem seems to be the costs of gathering
information on consumers’ abilities and preferences. Rural
communities typically include a large proportion of very lowincome consumers.143 Identifying those consumers who have
sufficient abilities to buy existing or hypothetical products
may be prohibitively costly. In addition, consumers’
preferences are difficult to observe. Traditional distribution
channels, an absence of effective means of communication,
Id.
Barker et al., The Do-Goodie Product, supra note 58, at 6.
141 PRAHALAD, supra note 41, at 37.
142 See D ARYL C OLLINS ET AL ., P ORTFOLIOS OF THE P OOR : H OW
W ORLD ’ S P OOR L IVE ON $2 A D AY (2009).
143 S ANAL K UMAR V ELAYUDHAN , R URAL M ARKETING : T ARGETING
N ON -U RBAN C ONSUMER 74–76 (2d ed. 2007).
139
140
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and linguistic and cultural differences make it costly for
firms to observe consumers’ spending patterns and tailor
their products to consumers’ needs and preferences.144
(2) Donative Organizations: The distribution of
essential goods and services raises concerns similar to those
of other subsidies, although the evidence is more equivocal.
Empirical studies that have compared the effect of
distributing versus selling products have yielded different
results. Many studies concentrate on bed nets and water
purifiers. On the one hand, there is significant evidence that
bed nets donated by NGOs have been inappropriately used
as fishing nets, not used at all, or even resold to others.145
Moreover, another study relating to chlorine shows that
consumers who pay higher prices are more likely to use it in
their drinking water.146 On the other hand, many other
studies suggest that demand for bed nets and health
products is very sensitive to price, and usage rates decline
sharply even when fees are very low.147 The reason appears
to be limited knowledge about the benefits of bed nets and
health products in preventing disease. These studies
arguably support the view that bed nets and other essential
products should be distributed to the poor for free.

See KARAMCHANDANI ET AL., supra note 41, at 36–37, 113;
PRAHALAD, supra note 41, at 37–38. Moreover, household income of the
poor tends to be not only low, but also irregular and unpredictable.
COLLINS ET AL., supra note 142, at 16–17; Ashish Karamchandani et al., Is
the Bottom of the Pyramid Really for You?, H ARV . B US . R EV ., March 2011,
at 107, 108.
145 Noboru Minakawa et al., Unforeseen Misuses of Bed Nets in
Fishing Villages Along Lake Victoria, 7 M ALARIA J. 165, 165 (2008);
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INSECTICIDE-TREATED MOSQUITO NETS: A
WHO
POSITION
STATEMENT
5
(2007),
http://files.givewell.org/files/DWDA%202009/
Interventions/Nets/itnspospaperfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3MY-AT7V].
146 Nava Ashraf et al., Can Higher Prices Stimulate Product Use?
Evidence from a Field Experiment in Zambia, 100 A M . E CON . R EV . 2383,
2385 (2010).
147 See Easterly, Can the West Save Africa?, supra note 84, at 411.
144
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Nonetheless, this evidence needs to be qualified. First, to
the extent that consumers are able to pay for goods or
services, as accepted in virtually all studies, subsidies are
inherently wasteful. As many poor individuals can afford to
pay at least a portion of the market price of a product, clearly
the efficient policy would be to use fewer subsidies per
beneficiary and produce more bed nets with the savings.
Second, none of these studies compares donative
organizations to social enterprises, such as low-cost sellers.
The sale of products under these studies is done through a
randomized process. Consequently, these studies cannot
capture the incentives of social enterprises to create a
market for their products and educate consumers about the
benefits of the products and how to use them. Therefore,
these studies do not prove that giving subsidies for free is
necessarily a good policy.148
(3) Social Enterprises: Low-cost sellers have incentives
to gather information on consumers’ ability to pay for their
products and to create a market for the product. Consider A
to Z. The Acumen Fund’s investment in A to Z, together with
other subsidies, has facilitated the production of millions of
bed nets per year. Although distribution of bed nets remains
essential for very low-income individuals, a social enterprise
that differentiates among consumers in accordance with
their ability to pay is a preferable approach to channeling
subsidies. For a given investment, many more bed nets will
be sold by a social enterprise than delivered by a donative
organization that bears the full costs of each bed net.149
148 For other criticisms of these studies, see Dani Rodrik, The New
Development Economics: We Shall Experiment, but How Shall We Learn?,
in W HAT W ORKS IN D EVELOPMENT ? T HINKING B IG AND T HINKING S MALL
24, 28 (William Easterly & Jessica Cohen eds., 2010). There is also a
concern that the subjects of these studies refuse to pay for products
because they anticipate receiving them for free in the future.
149 The Acumen Fund estimated that it would cost less than $0.02 to
protect one individual from malaria for one year by making an investment
in A to Z, compared to $0.84 through a donative organization. See ACUMEN
FUND,
THE BEST AVAILABLE CHARITABLE OPTION
3
(2007),
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Tiered price schemes that differentiate among consumers are
employed by other low-cost sellers, including both nonprofits
such as VisionSpring, a low-cost manufacturer and seller of
affordable reading glasses,150 and Aravind Eye Care System,
which provides low-cost eye-care services,151 as well as forprofits such as Ziqitza Healthcare Limited (“ZHL”), a private
ambulance service provider in areas lacking high-quality
emergency services.152 The output of each of these firms (e.g.,
glasses sold or eye surgeries performed) and their financial
sustainability serve as indicators of the effectiveness of their
subsidy allocation policies.
Low-cost sellers measure their beneficiaries’ attributes
mainly by using due diligence, given that their transactions
with the consumer-beneficiaries are discrete rather than
ongoing as in the case of loans or employment. Low-cost
sellers invest more capital than commercial enterprises
would in research on the relevant market to learn about
consumers’ spending patterns and preferences, as well as
distribution channels in these markets. In addition, they
invest in marketing and in educating consumers on the
benefits of certain products, such as bed nets and eye-care
products. A to Z, together with its nonprofit partners,
http://acumen.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/BACO-Concept-Paperfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/G79N-ZDU7].
150 See MOLLY CHRISTIANSEN & TED LONDON, SCOJO FOUNDATION: A
VISION FOR GROWTH AT THE BASE OF THE PYRAMID (2008), https://oikosinternational.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/oikos_Cases_2008_Scojo
_Foundation.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6YB-4ELW]; NICO CLEMMINCK &
SACHIN KADAKIA, WHAT WORKS: SCOJO INDIA FOUNDATION 20–21 (2007),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVMARKETPLACE/Resources/WhatWorks-Scojo-India.pdf [https://perma.cc/9T24-LFCA].
151 Aravind Eye Care System provides free surgeries to its poorest
customers. See KARAMCHANDANI ET AL., supra note 41, at 30.
152 ZHL charges patients who request to be taken to full-service
hospitals a standard fee and offers a discounted rate to those taken to
government hospitals. See GITA JOHAR & JOANNA HARRIES, DIAL 1298 FOR
AMBULANCE MARKETING EMS IN MUMBAI 3–4 (2010), http://acumen.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/1298-Ambulance-Columbia-B-School.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LW6L-6S49].
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developed a marketing, retail, and pricing system to
publicize and create demand for bed nets among the poor.153
Moreover, low-cost sellers design business models tailored to
the needs and preferences of low-income households,
including not only tiered pricing, but also innovative costcutting methods and specialized distribution channels. The
Aravind Eye Care service reduces the demand on doctors’
time by training skilled paramedics to undertake
standardized clinical tasks, so that doctors’ time is spent on
surgeries.154 VisionSpring has created an innovative
distribution system that relies on a web of local
entrepreneurs with good reputations and connections in
rural communities. Finally, after they start offering new
products, low-cost sellers further continue to evaluate
consumers’ preferences, adjust pricing, and design new
products.155

V. COMMITMENT DEVICES AND CHOICE OF
LEGAL FORM
The foregoing Section assumed that social enterprises
have a commitment to transacting with disadvantaged
individuals. As explained above, for-profit social enterprises
may use one of three commitment devices—certification,
contract, and control mechanisms156—while nonprofit social
enterprises rely on the non-distribution constraint.157 The
purpose of this Section is to examine in greater detail the
structure and function of different commitment devices.
Social enterprises invariably receive subsidies. In theory,
it would be ideal if social enterprises could provide detailed
information on the use of subsidies and their effects on
See KARUGU & MWENDWA, supra note 42, at 10–11.
KARAMCHANDANI ET AL., supra note 41, at 62.
155 See, e.g., CHRISTIANSEN & LONDON, supra note 150, at 6 (describing
how VisionSpring adjusts its strategy and pricing to market demand).
156 See supra Section II.A.2.
157 See supra Section II.A.3.
153
154
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beneficiaries’ welfare. However, monitoring the use of
subsidies and evaluating their benefits is very costly. Hence,
the solution is simply to create organizations that have
incentives to use subsidies effectively. Transacting with
patron-beneficiaries is the mechanism that gives social
enterprises incentives and tools to use subsidies effectively.
The essence of commitment devices is that a nonprofit is
responsible for identifying a class of patron-beneficiaries,
such as borrowers or workers, and verifying the transactions
with them. While it is very costly to evaluate the
effectiveness of subsidies in achieving development missions,
it is relatively simple for nonprofits to verify transactions
with patron-beneficiaries. Thus, transacting with the
beneficiaries not only underlies the measurement role of
social enterprises, but also facilitates the formation of social
enterprises as for-profits.
To be sure, commitment devices may go beyond verifying
the transaction with beneficiaries. Where the subsidy
providers expect a social enterprise to transact with
beneficiaries with below-competitive abilities who need some
form of subsidy (e.g., a better price or training), the
commitment devices also verify that such subsidies are
indeed distributed to beneficiaries.158 Otherwise, there is a
risk that social enterprises will transact exclusively with
patron-beneficiaries with fully competitive abilities (who do
not need subsidies) and those who control the organization
will appropriate that part of the subsidies.159 A good example
is the Fair Trade standards, which require producers to
provide a floor price and a social premium.
Before embarking on the analysis of different devices, it is
worth mentioning that the ability of social enterprises to
form as both for-profits and nonprofits gives some credence

158 In fact, the same commitment devices can be used to commit to
any form of hybrid organization, for example, corporate charity. See infra
Part VI.
159 This risk is often referred to as “mission-drift.” See infra Section
VII.A.
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to the claim that the distinction between the for-profit and
nonprofit forms has been gradually eroding.160 Nonetheless,
it is important to emphasize that all the commitment devices
of for-profit social enterprises rely on organizations that are
subject to the non-distribution constraint to monitor the forprofit entity. Accordingly, contrary to some recent claims
that the non-distribution constraint has lost its usefulness as
a commitment device,161 it remains a key component of the
commitment devices associated with for-profit social
enterprises. The rationale is that organizations that are
subject to a non-distribution constraint can be trusted to
monitor for-profits.

A. Certification Mechanisms
Certification mechanisms consist of a nonprofit or
government agency that evaluates whether or not firms
satisfy certain standards. Certification is feasible only when
it is possible to create uniform standards with respect to both
the class of beneficiaries and the type of subsidies that
should be allocated to them. The best-known example is Fair
Trade certification described above. FLO certifies the class of
patron-beneficiaries as “small producers,” and it ensures
through audits and inspections that the producers are
allocated subsidies in the form of the Fair Trade minimum
See THE ASPEN INST., ENTERPRISING ORGANIZATIONS: NEW ASSETOTHER INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO SOLVING SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC
PROBLEMS
1,
2
(2005),
https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/docs/pubs/E
nterprisingOrgs%20(for%20web).pdf
[https://perma.cc/L9CF-TPF2];
Joseph J. Cordes & C. Eugene Steuerle, Nonprofits and Business: A New
World of Innovation and Adaptation, in N ONPROFITS AND B USINESS 1
(Joseph J. Cordes & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2008); Alter, supra note 9, at
205; Jonathan Conning & Jonathan Morduch, Microfinance and Social
Investment, 3 A NN . R EV . F IN . E CON . 407, 414 (2011).
161 See
D AN P ALLOTTA , U NCHARITABLE : H OW R ESTRAINTS ON
N ONPROFITS U NDERMINE T HEIR P OTENTIAL 116–19 (2008); Malani &
Posner, supra note 6, at 2021–22; Clara Miller, The Equity Capital Gap,
S TAN . S OC . I NNOVATION R EV ., Summer 2008, at 41–42.
160
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price, a social premium, and pre-financing of up to 60% of
the orders.162 Because coffee and other agricultural products,
such as bananas, are traded on global commodity exchanges,
it is possible to identify commodity prices and prescribe
standards for financing and premiums. Small producers can
also be identified relatively easily, albeit imperfectly, by
simply referring to those farmers who rely on family labor.
By contrast, in industries such as banking and investment,
where prices and business practice can vary from one firm to
another, it is harder to create a uniform standard.
A unique feature of fair trade certification is that the
certification is per each unit of product. The Fair Trade label
is attached to products that comply with the Fair Trade
standards. The certification signals to consumers that
products are deserving of a subsidy. Certification per product
enables firms to have both a social enterprise and a profitmaximizing enterprise operated by the same organization
(e.g., Starbucks selling fair trade products).
When the subsidies flow from other sources, such as the
government, a common approach is to use certification of the
firm as a whole. An example discussed above is certification
by the CDFI Fund, which provides below-market rate
investments and guarantees to eligible CDFIs.163 The class of
beneficiaries is defined by reference to aggregate wealth
measures of the relevant market, defined to include areas
where the percentage of the population living in poverty is at
least 20%, where the median family income is below 80% of
the national average, or where the unemployment rate is 1.5
times the national average.164 Another example is
incorporation under certain European hybrid legal forms
(e.g., the Italian social cooperative), which require that at
least a certain percentage of the workers of the incorporating

162
163
164

See supra note 51.
CDFI COALITION, supra note 31.
12 C.F.R. § 1805.201(b)(3)(ii)(C) (2016).
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firm belong to a class of disadvantaged individuals.165
Incorporation as a hybrid essentially constitutes a
certification of the firm as a WISE and makes the firm
eligible for certain government subsidies.

B. Contractual Mechanisms
An alternative commitment device is a contract with a
nonprofit organization stipulating that the subsidies will be
used for their intended purpose.166 Contractual mechanisms
are typically used when the subsidy to the social enterprise
is provided by a donative organization. Contractual
mechanisms allow greater flexibility than certification and
individual tailoring in defining the class of beneficiaries and
the type of disbursals allocated to them. Low-cost sellers may
need flexibility in adjusting their prices and discounts to
different customers who have different levels of wealth. As
discussed above, as part of its partnership with various
nonprofit organizations, including the World Health
Organization and NGOs, A to Z is committed to marketing
and selling bed nets at different discounts funded by the
partnership or the local government. With respect to CDFIs,
as mentioned above, the CDFI Fund is required to enter into
an Assistance Agreement with certified CDFIs that are
awarded a subsidy.167 The agreement must specify, inter
alia, the CDFI’s performance goals and the terms offered to
low-income borrowers.168 While certification is used to define
the class of beneficiaries, greater flexibility is necessary to

165 See Cafaggi & Iamiceli, supra note 5, at 7–14; see also Francine J.
Lipman, Enabling Work for People with Disabilities: A Post-Integrationist
Revision of Underutilized Tax Incentives, 53 A M . U. L. R EV . 393, 429–30
(2003) (defining disadvantaged individuals to include disabled people, exoffenders, welfare recipients or recipients of unemployment insurance).
166
See Allen R. Bromberger, A New Type of Hybrid, S TAN . S OC .
I NNOVATION R EV ., Spring 2011, at 49.
167 12 C.F.R. § 1805.801 (2016).
168 Id.; 12 C.F.R. § 1805.803 (2016).
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tailor the terms provided to the beneficiaries’ economic and
social conditions.

C. Control Mechanisms
The most flexible commitment device is control by a
nonprofit. The controlling nonprofit typically provides
subsidies to the social enterprise, for example subsidized
capital. Control allows the nonprofit owner to determine the
class of beneficiaries and the type of disbursals (if any). The
Greyston Bakery is owned by a single owner, the Greyston
Foundation.169 Complete ownership of the social enterprise,
however, is not necessary. As discussed above, a controlling
stake in Compartamos, whose shares are publicly listed, is
held by nonprofits, such as NGOs and foundations. This
mechanism provides the nonprofit owners reasonable
assurance that the firm will not change its mission if lending
to low-income persons entails opportunity costs.
An example of a social investment firm is the IGNIA
Fund, which invests in businesses in developing countries in
various fields, such as healthcare services and organic
farming. The fund is structured as a limited partnership (i.e.,
a for-profit entity), but is owned by the International
Finance
Corporation,
foundations,
and
social
entrepreneurs.170 Many low-cost sellers also use control
mechanisms. ZHL, described above,171 is owned by the
169 As the Greyston Bakery is wholly owned by a nonprofit, it may be
argued that it should simply form as a nonprofit. However, as pointed out
supra Section II.A.1, the bakery pays below-market wages to its workers,
and therefore it is arguably not operating exclusively for an exempt
purpose under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Further, the Greyston Foundation may
possibly be contemplating the sale of a stake in the bakery to private
investors. In fact, seemingly for this reason, the Greyston bakery recently
reincorporated as a New York Benefit Corporation. See infra Section IX.A.
170 Author’s conversation with Alonso Bustamante Guerra, Senior
Analyst, IGNIA Fund, (Oct. 19, 2009); see also Investors, IGNIA,
http://www.ignia.com.mx/bop/investors.php [https://perma.cc/R8XY-HGB3]
(last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
171 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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Acumen Fund (a nonprofit social investment firm) and social
entrepreneurs.
Another way to implement a control mechanism is to
place the voting rights, at least on fundamental issues, in the
hands of a nonprofit. For example, the shares of the social
investment firm, Triodos Bank, are held by a foundation that
makes voting decisions on behalf of the holders of depository
receipts.172 Similarly, as described above, the guardian share
of Cafédirect is held by a subsidiary of Oxfam International
and a cooperative of producers that transact with the firm.
The guardian share has the right to block any proposal,
including a takeover that might compromise the firm’s social
mission.173
As compared to other commitment devices, control
mechanisms allow social enterprises flexibility in deciding
which beneficiaries merit assistance and what kind of
subsidies they should receive. This appears to be the reason
why MFIs and social investment firms use control
mechanisms. Creating a uniform standard for developing
countries in the fields of banking, investment, retail, and
services may be difficult. For example, Compartamos lends
mainly to the moderately poor and the vulnerable nonpoor.174 Other for-profit MFIs that have adopted control
mechanisms transact with customers who need greater
assistance and discounted interest rates.175 Similarly,
whereas the IGNIA Fund seeks to generate returns
equivalent to those of private equity firms, Triodos Bank
earns moderate returns on equity.176
By contrast, the CDFI regime is more specific in nature.
The certification of CDFIs and their contracts with the CDFI

For a detailed description, see supra Section II.A.1.
See supra Section II.A.1.
174 COMPARTAMOS OFFERING CIRCULAR, supra note 26, at 77.
175 See Thomas Dichter, Basix (India): The Challenges of Permanently
Pioneering (Jan. 20, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
176 TRIODOS BANK ANNUAL REPORT 2015, supra note 38, at 25 (noting a
return on equity of 5.5% in 2015).
172
173
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Fund (i.e., the Assistance Agreements) determine specific
standards. In developed countries where measures of poverty
and income are widely available and the banking system is
well developed, there is better information on which
customers should count as beneficiaries and what terms
should be afforded to them. It is harder to create specific
standards in developing countries, where there is a greater
variety of investees in terms of abilities.
The flexibility of control mechanisms is also reinforced by
their use by FTSEs, such as Cafédirect. Unlike other FTSEs,
such as Starbucks, Cafédirect sells exclusively fair trade
products. The control mechanism allows the firm to commit
to more demanding standards than those prescribed by FLO.
Thus, Cafédirect buys inputs from producers who are less
capable than other small producers that qualify as such for
the purpose of certification, pays larger premiums to its
producers than those required by FLO, and provides more
training to them. Thus, control mechanisms enable firms to
tailor the Fair Trade standards to their own business model.
In addition, control mechanisms usually serve as a
commitment by the firm to the owners who provide the
subsidy to the firm. Certification and contractual
mechanisms provide assurance mainly to external subsidy
providers, such as customers or government agencies. The
subsidy to MFIs and social investment firms is usually
provided by their nonprofit owners in the form of capital and
below-market
returns.
The
nonprofit
owners
of
Compartamos can ensure that their firm will not change its
business and cease to serve low-income customers. In the
case of FTSEs, certification per product is directed towards
customers, but is inadequate to assure nonprofit owners that
their subsidies will be committed to the long-term mission of
the firm. Firms that use product certification, such as
Starbucks, may abandon their fair trade business without
expropriating any subsidies because the subsidies, i.e., the
premiums over market prices, are per product. But, owners
may want to ensure that the firm will remain committed to
transacting with disadvantaged individuals, at least for as
long as they continue to own it. This is another reason why
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D. The Nonprofit Form
Many social enterprises continue to form as commercial
nonprofits.177 A key reason for choosing the nonprofit form is
its tax advantages in sourcing donations and income tax
exemptions.178 When social enterprises are likely to have low
profitability, they are more likely to rely on donations and
income tax exemptions. Low profitability can arise either
because such firms transact with beneficiaries with
relatively low abilities who need substantial disbursals, or
because there is a high variance in beneficiaries’ abilities
that requires the firm to invest substantial resources in
measurement and tailoring subsidies to their needs.
As discussed above, Compartamos makes loans primarily
to moderately poor borrowers in markets where there is
relatively better information on borrowers’ creditworthiness,
and it charges high interest rates. By contrast, nonprofit
MFIs, such as ASA and BRAC, provide very small loans to
poorer borrowers, mainly women, in rural markets where
information is scarce. Therefore, they charge relatively low
interest rates and provide a range of services to their
borrowers, including schooling, training, and help with
business and marketing plans.179 In fact, Compartamos itself
started out as a nonprofit firm and converted into a for-profit
as its borrowers developed stronger business acumen and
credit history, and the firm acquired better information on
its target market.180
See supra Section II.A.3.
Nonprofit social enterprises also have stronger incentives to
transact with beneficiaries with lower abilities. See infra Section VII.A.
179 A RMENDÁRIZ & MORDUCH, supra note 16, at 22.
180 See Compartamos Banco, ACCION, https://www.accion.org/ourimpact/compartamos-banco [https://perma.cc/J7H7-DPGN] (last visited
Mar. 18, 2017). An additional example is the Acumen Fund, a nonprofit
that targets investments that may not generate market returns, and
177
178
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VI. OTHER FORMS OF HYBRID ORGANIZATION
Most accounts of hybrid organizations do not distinguish
between social enterprise and all other types of hybrid
organization. From a policy perspective, equating social
enterprises to other hybrid organizations may yield illadvised policy recommendations because many hybrid
organizations, especially corporations that engage in
corporate social responsibility and corporate charity, do not
perform the measurement role of social enterprises. In fact,
as shown below, most of them engage in transferring or
giving subsidies to beneficiaries, and therefore, are less
likely to be effective in addressing complex development
missions. Thus, policy recommendations to extend tax
benefits to organizations with a mixed mission are likely to
be misguided.181

A. Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate
Charity
In its most standard form, corporate social responsibility
(“CSR”) policies and corporate charity involve the allocation
of a subsidy from a for-profit firm to external beneficiaries,
whether as a monetary donation to a donative organization
(e.g., Oxfam) or a training subsidy to the poor.182 In either of
these cases, the firm has no commitment to transacting with
beneficiaries as patrons. As a result, the effectiveness of CSR
and corporate charity are subject to the same problems as
subsidies allocated by donative organizations. In the absence
of information on external beneficiaries, subsidies are
therefore the Acumen Fund partly relies on donative funding. See LEE,
supra note 103. The IGNIA Fund, by contrast, is a for-profit limited
partnership that seeks to make commercial returns on its investments.
See
Our
Story,
IGNIA,
http://www.ignia.mx/about-us/
[https://perma.cc/2NPF-CKJ4] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
181 One example is Malani & Posner’s proposal to extend tax benefits
to for-profits for their charitable or socially responsible activities. See
Malani & Posner, supra note 6.
182 See supra Section II.C.
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unlikely to be effective. Moreover, most for-profit
corporations that engage in CSR or corporate charity do not
usually adopt a commitment device. Accordingly, there is a
clear risk that for-profit corporations will exaggerate the
magnitude and effectiveness of their CSR policies in order to
enhance their reputations among consumers.183 Drawing
goodwill and additional revenues from consumers by
exaggerating the effect and extent of CSR policies may be
viewed as an expropriation of subsidies from consumers.184
An example of the limited effectiveness of CSR is in fact
Google’s celebrated charitable arm described above.
Although Google continues to donate generously to
charitable causes, Google.org has so far failed to live up to its
ambitious goal of creating novel solutions to poverty
alleviation and climate change.185
Some corporations do actually adopt commitment devices
that implement CSR policies or corporate charity, and to this
extent, there is a lesser risk of expropriation. RedF is an
example of a certification mechanism. RedF is an LLC that
licenses the Red trademark to commercial firms, including
Apple, Starbucks and Gap;186 these firms attach the Red
label to certain products. When customers buy Red products,
the firm is committed under its contract with RedF to
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
In fact, CSR policies and corporate charity may even be used by
inefficient managers to entrench themselves by gaining stakeholders’ and
media support or to support charities affiliated with CEOs at the expense
of shareholder value. See Giovanni Cespa & Giacinta Cestone, Corporate
Social Responsibility and Managerial Entrenchment, 16 J. E CON . &
M GMT . Strategy 741 (2007); Ronald W. Masulis and Syed Walid Reza,
Agency Problems of Corporate Philanthropy, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 592 (2015).
185 See Brian Galle, Social Enterprise: Who Needs It? 54 B.C. L. R EV .
2025, 2034–35 (2014); Stephanie Strom & Miguel Helft, Google Finds It
Hard to Reinvent Philanthropy, N.Y. T IMES , (Jan. 29, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/30/business/30charity.html
[https://perma.cc/A9S2-ARJF].
186 Sarah Dadush, Profiting in (Red): The Need for Enhanced
Transparency in Cause-Related Marketing, 42 N.Y.U. J. I NT ’ L L. & P OL .
1269, 1270 (2010).
183
184
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making a certain donation, for example to the Global Fund, a
donative organization dedicated to fighting AIDS.187 Thus
the firm adjusts the amount of its donations in accordance
with the volume of purchases of Red products by customers.
However, while this may be a novel mechanism for firms to
market their charitable activities and receive feedback from
customers concerning their desired volume, it is essentially a
form of corporate charity rather than a social enterprise.
An example of a control mechanism used as a
commitment to charity is Better World Books, a firm that
sells used books and is committed to supporting literacy
groups.188 Many of the books sold by the firm are donated to
it to support its social mission. Literacy nonprofits have
options in Better World Books that are vested on two
metrics, performance measures of their social mission and
how many donated books they bring in. The vested options
ensure that upon sale of the firm, the nonprofits will receive
a proportion of the sale amount.189 Performance, which is
related to students’ progress, is relatively easy to measure,
and the disbursals to the literacy nonprofits appear to be
effective. Again, the basic structure of Better World Books,
albeit highly innovative, is identical to corporate charity, i.e.,
a for-profit making a donation to a nonprofit. In this case,
though, there seems to be measurable information on the
effectiveness of subsidies.
Finally, it is noteworthy that in some cases CSR policies
actually do involve the allocation of a subsidy to a patronbeneficiary, rather than an external beneficiary. Although
the distinction is a subtle one, such CSR policies are
distinguishable
from
social
enterprises.
Consider
multinationals, such as Nike and Levi’s, which pay premium
Id. The exact amount of the donations is not actually transparent,
and to this extent there is in fact a risk of expropriation. See id. at 1272–
73.
188 See Kevin Jones, Mission Insurance: How to Structure a Social
Enterprise So Its Social and Environmental Goals Survive into the Future,
5 C OMMUNITY D EV . I NV . R EV . 1 (2009).
189 Id. at 5–6.
187
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wages to their workers in developing countries and avoid
transacting with sweatshops. Such firms appear structurally
similar to WISEs because they channel subsidies to their
workers. However, these policies are mainly driven by the
perceived unfairness of low wages and harsh working
conditions as compared to equivalent standards in developed
countries,190 even though in economic terms, wages and
working conditions are both efficient and higher than those
offered by local firms.
These policies are different from WISEs with regard to
the problems they are designed to address, especially the
inability
of
capable
workers
from
disadvantaged
backgrounds to obtain employment. In this case, the workers
are already employed and receive an efficient wage.
Accordingly, it does not make sense to view Nike or Levi’s as
having a commitment to transacting with their workers, as it
is already profit-maximizing to transact with them even
without a subsidy. The workers are not individuals that
suffer from systemic unemployment, and employing them
does not serve the measurement role performed by social
enterprises. Premium wages and better working conditions
are simply a disbursal of a subsidy to the existing patrons of
the firm.
To be sure, this type of subsidy may be desirable where
governments fail to regulate workers’ rights and minimum
working conditions, especially in developing countries.
However, such CSR policies are typically implemented only
as a response to blatant governmental failures and where
commercial firms face high reputational costs. Additionally,
firms that make these subsidies do not usually adopt a
commitment device. Therefore, without appropriate
government regulation or at least NGO supervision, working

190 See Geoffrey Heal, Corporate Social Responsibility: An Economic
and Financial Framework, 30 G ENEVA P APERS ON R ISK & I NS ., 387, 389,
392–93 (2005).
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conditions at standard commercial firms are likely to
suffer.191

B. Socially Responsible Investing
In recent decades, institutional investors, such as pension
funds and mutual funds, have become increasingly engaged
in socially responsible investing (“SRI”). As of 2014, $6.57
trillion in total assets under professional management in the
United States used at least one SRI strategy.192 SRI refers to
investment strategies that consider both financial return and
some social good, especially environmental, social, and
governance (“ESG”) issues. ESG issues range from
environmental efficiency, through human rights and
diversity, to corporate governance. The most common
manifestations of SRI are negative screening of companies
that engage in providing goods or services like alcohol,
tobacco, or gambling, and shareholder advocacy on ESG
issues. Some forms of social enterprise referred to as
“community investing” are also commonly included under
SRI, such as CDFIs and social investment firms. Though
community investing is growing at a rapid rate as an asset
class, its assets are only a marginal fraction of SRI.
At any rate, to view SRI and social enterprise as
synonymous is misguided. First, it is not clear whether SRI
(other than community investing) is a subsidized form of
organization. In fact, some studies find that returns on SRI
funds are better than on other funds.193 Additionally, the
191 To be sure, WISEs, like any other firm, may also engage in CSR
and corporate charity by providing premium wages; the key point is that
this is not a role that WISEs need to perform to qualify as social
enterprises.
192 THE FORUM FOR SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE INV., REPORT ON US
SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS 12 (2014),
http://www.ussif.org/store_category.asp?id=4
[https://perma.cc/BAE39T5J].
193 See, e.g., Michael L. Barnett & Robert M. Salomon, Beyond
Dichotomy: The Curvilinear Relationship between Social Responsibility
and Financial Performance, 27 S TRATEGY M GMT . J. 1101, 1103 (2006);
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recent trend to treat corporate governance as an ESG issue
appears to be motivated by a desire to enhance shareholder
value rather than transfer subsidies to third parties.
Therefore, SRI funds are not necessarily a type of hybrid
organization. Second, even if SRI in its most common form
qualifies as a subsidized commercial enterprise (i.e., a hybrid
organization), SRI funds do not transact with their
beneficiaries. As a result, measuring the social impact of SRI
as compared to a standard form of investing is inherently
imprecise. In addition, it is noteworthy that commitment
devices may be weak in some SRI funds. While some funds
can change their social criteria only with a shareholder vote,
other funds can alter investing policy without consulting the
shareholders.194 Hence, there is some risk that capital raised
under one set of ESG issues will be applied to advance a
weaker or stronger set of issues.

C. Social Ratings
Partly to address the measurement problem inherent in
social missions, many organizations are developing new
social rating mechanisms for evaluating the social impact of
for-profit firms. One prominent example is B-Lab, a
nonprofit that certifies companies as “B-Corps” and rates
them in accordance with certain criteria relating to
governance, workers, community, and the environment.195
Christopher C. Geczy et al., Investing in Socially Responsible Mutual
Funds
(Oct.
2005),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=416380
[https://perma.cc/B2A4-8JCX].
194 Geczy et al., supra note 193, at 12.
195 Other rating mechanisms include the following: (1) the Global
Reporting Initiative (“GRI”), a nonprofit that certifies companies’
sustainability reports in accordance with certain standards, see About
GRI,
GRI,
https://www.globalreporting.org/Information/aboutgri/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/PS9Y-FYEL] (last visited Mar. 18,
2017); (2) the Global Impact Rating System (“GIIRS”), a nonprofit that
rates companies’ social and environmental impact using a different set of
standards, the Impact Reporting and Investment Standards (“IRIS”), see
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There is, however, uncertainty regarding which factors
should be included in such standards. For example, the first
public corporation certified as a B-Corp, Etsy Inc., a company
that operates an online marketplace for crafts, was praised
for its commitment to social and environmental goals.196
However, it is hard to see how Etsy is materially different
from standard commercial firms, as it doesn’t seem to
channel material subsidies to third parties. Moreover, there
has been substantial pressure from tax activists to deny
Etsy’s re-certification as a B-Corp because of its aggressive
tax planning that involved using an Irish subsidiary to
minimize tax liability.197 This arguably casts doubt on Etsy’s
commitment to produce public benefits.
To be sure, some of the criteria embedded in B-Lab’s
standards correspond to the elements that characterize
social enterprises, such as the percentage of disadvantaged
employees, or whether the firm provides services to poor
customers. For example, B-Lab’s rating does reward
companies for employing disadvantaged workers. However,
What GIIRLS Does, GIIRLS, http://giirs.nonprofitsoapbox.com/aboutgiirs/about [https://perma.cc/54FJ-E7D2] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017) and
About
IRIS,
IRIS,
https://iris.thegiin.org/about-iris
[https://perma.cc/2RRK-PJ7N] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017); (3) the Social
Return on Investment (“SROI”) Network, which trains practitioners to
quantify in monetary terms the social and environmental impact of
companies in accordance with the SROI principles, see Practitioner
Training, SOCIAL VALUE, http://www.socialvalueuk.org/sroi-practitionertraining/ [https://perma.cc/MA2Q-DACH] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017) and
The SROI Network, IRIS, https://iris.thegiin.org/users/profile/the-sroinetwork [https://perma.cc/5VX2-Z7K5] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
196 See Jena McGregor, What Etsy, Patagonia and Warby Parker Have
in
Common,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
20,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2015/04/20/whatetsy-patagonia-and-warby-parker-have-in-common/
[https://perma.cc/KNN9-NRRS].
197 See Alex Barinka & Jesse Drucker, Etsy Taps Secret Irish Tax
Haven and Brags About Transparency at Home, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 14,
2015, 12:01 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-0814/etsy-taps-secret-irish-tax-haven-and-touts-transparency-at-home
[https://perma.cc/FJ3R-FARJ].
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B-Lab’s standards go far beyond these elements to include a
host of measures whose value is debatable.198 First, these
metrics include activities whose benefits flow to external
beneficiaries, such as corporate charity or environmentally
friendly policies. But, as argued throughout this Article, the
benefits to external beneficiaries are hard to measure and
subject to uncertainty. There is little evidence that B-Lab or
any other social rating organization has created a credible
way to track and quantify such benefits. Second, the utility
of many of the policies advocated by these standards, such as
employee ownership or involving stakeholders in decisionmaking, is either questionable or context-dependent. Third,
certain policies, such as strong corporate governance
provisions, are potentially profit-maximizing, and it is not
clear why they should be mixed up with standards that
measure social impact. Finally, some of these standards and
their implementation tend to be opaque and depend on
subjective assessment of impacts.199 There is a concern that
subsidies provided by trusting consumers may be
expropriated by managers of firms that obtain social ratings
that exceed their true contributions to altruistic causes.

D. Environmentally Friendly Firms
Firms that adopt environmentally friendly policies may
be viewed as hybrid organizations mainly because their
198 Recently, the Greyston Bakery has obtained B-Corp certification.
Interestingly, Greyston ranks high on measures of “community” but below
the median on measures of “workers” which evaluate how the firm treats
its workers through compensation, employment opportunities, health and
safety,
etc.
See
Greyston
Bakery,
Inc.,
B
CORP.,
https://www.bcorporation.net/community/greyston-bakery-inc
[https://perma.cc/9HRJ-Q76X] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
199 See BUGG-LEVINE & EMERSON, supra note 3, at 163–186; Alnoor
Ebrahim & V. Kasturi Rangan, The Limits of Nonprofit Impact: A
Contingency Framework for Measuring Social Performance 9–13 (Harvard
Bus.
Sch.,
Working
Paper
No.
10-099,
2010),
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/10-099.pdf
venture[https://perma.cc/8K3U-TUP4].
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consumers pay subsidies in the form of price premiums,
which the firms use to produce public goods.200 There are two
main types of environmentally friendly firms. The first type
includes firms such as Walmart and IBM that have adopted
environmentally friendly policies as part of their CSR
agenda to boost reputation and goodwill.201 Many of these
firms have not adopted a commitment device, and therefore
there is a risk that they will draw goodwill and subsidies
from consumers while overstating the extent of their
contribution to the environment, a practice known as greenwashing. To take one stark example, British Petroleum, an
oil company that was commended for its environmental
initiatives, turned out to have a troubling record of violating
safety regulations, culminating in the oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico in 2010. 202
The second type involves firms that have adopted a
commitment device. An example is Patagonia, a firm that
produces outdoor clothing using materials that are less
harmful to the environment, such as organic cotton, and
environmentally friendly production processes, including
reduction of its carbon emissions and the use of recycled
materials.203 Patagonia’s consumers appear to pay a

To be sure, some environmentally friendly policies may be profitmaximizing without a subsidy, for example, reducing the use of gas or
fuels.
201 See D ANIEL C. E STY & A NDREW S. W INSTON , G REEN T O G OLD :
H OW S MART C OMPANIES U SE E NVIRONMENTAL S TRATEGY TO I NNOVATE ,
C REATE V ALUE , AND B UILD C OMPETITIVE A DVANTAGE 7–8, 106 (2006).
202 The company was in fact ranked first among international firms
for its environmental impact. Id., at 25; NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE
GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING (2011),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPOOILCOMMISSION.pdf [https://perma.cc/BMT2-M4X7].
203 See FOREST REINHARDT ET AL., PATAGONIA (2004) (Harv. Bus. Sch.
Case 9-703-035) [hereinafter PATAGONIA 1]; FOREST REINHARDT ET AL.,
PATAGONIA (2010) (Harv. Bus. Sch. Case 9-711-020) [hereinafter
PATAGONIA 2].
200
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premium for the environmental quality of its products,204 and
its sole owner seems willing to accept lower rates to fund the
firm’s environmental mission.205 Patagonia has adopted
several commitment devices. First, the firm is owned by a
social entrepreneur who has a reputation for his
commitment to the environment. Second, some of its
products are certified by the bluesign® system, a
certification awarded to textile products that comply with
standards relating to energy use, water consumption and use
of hazardous chemicals.206 Moreover, the firm has obtained
certification as a B-Corp, which includes environmental
performance.207
Although Patagonia’s commitment to environmental
causes is laudable, the true benefits of its policies are
difficult to measure. Despite a growing consensus on the
benefits of protecting the environment, such benefits are not
easily observable and may be difficult to quantify. One
possible explanation for this is that the beneficiaries of
environmentally friendly, or more generally public goods,
firms are external. Public goods are non-rival and nonexcludable, so that in principle anyone can consume them.
Environmentally friendly firms thus cannot transact with
their beneficiaries who consume those public goods; anyone
can enjoy the cleaner air and water that result from the
firms’ policies. Accordingly, they have limited tools to
evaluate the benefits of their environmental policies.
To be sure, environmentally friendly firms perform an
important function. Given their commitment to adopting
204 See PATAGONIA 1, supra note 203, at 10 (Patagonia’s products sell
for 15% to 50% or more above other similar brands, although this
premium may be due to product quality).
205 See PATAGONIA 2, supra note 203, at 4, 27 (noting that Patagonia’s
margins decreased following the shift to organic cotton).
206 See BLUESIGN, https://www.bluesign.com/ [https://perma.cc/42ZPCAM9] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
207 See
Patagonia,
Inc.,
B
CORP.,
https://www.bcorporation.net/community/patagonia-inc
[https://perma.cc/EVG3-Q3J7] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
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environmentally friendly processes, these firms have a profit
incentive to reduce the costs of such processes. The subsidies
in these firms are used to fund the costs of creating an
efficient business model that generates public goods. In some
cases, such business models may fail. For example, there
have been several unsuccessful attempts to make shoes from
recyclable materials.208 On the other hand, Patagonia has
successfully developed innovative processes for making
clothes from organic cotton.209 Reducing the production costs
of environmentally friendly products is important for the
sake of leading other firms to adopt similar policies or
making a case for environmental regulation.

E. Using Hybrid Organizations to Increase Donative
Capital
While social enterprises may involve collaborations
between nonprofits and for-profits, not all such
collaborations necessarily create a social enterprise.
Sometimes a donative organization will simply set up a forprofit in order to make investments that increase the size of
its assets. It then invests donative capital in the for-profit
entity, and the returns on that investment are distributed to
external beneficiaries of the donative organization. One
notable example that has existed for many years in the U.S.
is museum shops that sell books and artwork to museum
visitors. The shop is typically a for-profit entity owned by the
nonprofit museum. The shop qualifies as a hybrid
organization because it receives subsidized capital, but it has
no commitment to transacting with disadvantaged
individuals. Another more recent example is Housing Works,
an organization dedicated to combating AIDS and

208 See, e.g., PAUL W. HARDY, DEJA SHOE (A): CREATING THE
ENVIRONMENTAL FOOTWEAR COMPANY (1996) (University of Michigan
CEPM Case Study).
209 Reinhardt et al., PATAGONIA 1, supra note 203, at 26, 27.
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homelessness.210 It is composed of several businesses,
including a coffee shop, a secondhand bookstore, and a
secondhand clothing store. The profits made by the shops are
distributed to the owner, i.e., the donative organization, and
used to allocate subsidies to external beneficiaries, especially
through housing assistance.

VII. DISADVANTAGES OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
A. Mission-Drift
A common criticism of for-profit social enterprises is that
they have incentives to seek profits at the expense of their
social missions.211 This criticism may broadly be divided into
two claims. First, social enterprises have an incentive to
transact only with patron-beneficiaries with fully
competitive abilities and avoid those who have belowcompetitive abilities. However, this is only a problem where
the subsidies provided to the social enterprise are also
intended to be used as disbursals to patron-beneficiaries
with below-competitive abilities. Such subsidies may be
distributed to the owners as profits or simply wasted. In this
situation, the commitment device should identify the
beneficiaries as including those with below-competitive
abilities and specify the disbursals afforded to them. In
practice, though, there do not seem to be many known cases
of such problems.212 Organizations that focus on patron210 See
HOUSING
WORKS,
http://www.housingworks.org/
[https://perma.cc/8PSZ-RL2V] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
211 See, e.g., Nobel Laureate Muhammed Yunus Speaks Out Against
For-Profit Microfinance from Asia-Pacific Microcred, MICROFINANCE
TRANSPARENCY (Aug. 12, 2008), http://www.mftransparency.org/nobellaureate-muhammad-yunus-speaks-out-against-for-profit-microfinancefrom-asia-pacific-microcred/ [https://perma.cc/8MQ9-JKFG].
212 One situation when this may be possible is where the definition of
patron-beneficiary is inadequate. Arguably, under the Fair Trade
standards, small producers may not always be disadvantaged, such as
where small producers’ cooperatives have sufficient capital and resources.
See MARC SIDWELL, UNFAIR TRADE (2008). There have also been concerns
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beneficiaries with higher abilities are usually committed to
serving only such patrons. For example, Compartamos,
which is often criticized for neglecting the destitute, is
admittedly committed only to serving the vulnerable nonpoor and the moderately poor.213 There presumably is scope
both for organizations that serve only patrons with fully
competitive abilities and for those that also serve patronbeneficiaries with lower abilities. Thus, nonprofit MFIs tend
to focus more on small loans to poorer borrowers and women,
while for-profit MFIs tend to make larger loans to less-poor
borrowers.214
Second, the profit motive may induce for-profit social
enterprises to exploit their patron-beneficiaries by offering
them unfavorable terms. The most conspicuous example is
the recent criticism of predatory lending practices employed
by MFIs in some regions, including exorbitant rates,
misleading advertising, excessive penalties, and aggressive
or illegal collection methods.215 Compartamos, for example,
has been criticized for its loan rates, which average almost
90%.216

that some WISEs only employ workers with higher abilities. See Carlo
Borzaga & Monica Loss, Profiles and Trajectories of Participants in
European Work Integration Social Enterprises, in S OCIAL E NTERPRISE AT
THE C ROSSROADS OF M ARKET , P UBLIC P OLICIES AND C IVIL S OCIETY 169
(Marthe Nyseens ed., 2006).
213 COMPARTAMOS OFFERING CIRCULAR, supra note 26, at 77.
214 Conning & Morduch, supra note 160, at 413–14.
215 See id. at 411–12; Eric Bellman & Arlen Chang, India's Major
Crisis in Microlending, W ALL . S T . J. (Oct. 28, 2010, 12:01 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304316404575580663
294846100 [https://perma.cc/Z2EH-69WQ]; Keith Epstein & Geri Smith,
The Ugly Side of Microlending, B LOOMBERG (Dec. 13, 2007, 12:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2007-12-12/the-ugly-side-ofmicrolending [https://perma.cc/44L8-PBJ5].
216 This figure includes a 15% government tax. See Elisabeth Malkin,
Microfinance’s Success Sets off a Debate in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5,
2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/05/business/worldbusiness/05micro.html
[https://perma.cc/MP85-ARW7].
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The problem, however, seems to lie in the lack of effective
regulatory frameworks to protect consumers and employees
in many developing countries.217 In general, there are two
main strategies to address this problem. The first strategy is
to adopt industry standards and private monitoring in areas
such as labor standards and consumer protection. In the
context of MFIs, for example, there have been initiatives to
introduce consumer protection standards to address the risk
of predatory lending.218 The second strategy is to adopt the
nonprofit form or to allocate ownership rights to the
beneficiaries. The rationale for this approach is that these
mechanisms mitigate the incentives of social enterprise
firms to pursue profit, and therefore they are less likely to
exploit the beneficiaries.219 Of course, as is well known, the
downside of eliminating investor ownership is that it may
inhibit the firm’s ability to raise capital and lower incentives
for socially valuable innovation.

B. Difficulties in Attracting Capital
Although for-profit social enterprises are generally better
at attracting capital than traditional nonprofits, they face
difficulties in attracting equity capital. In particular, social
enterprises that rely on control mechanisms that vest control
of the firm in the hands of a small group of nonprofits and
217 PATRICK MEAGHER, MICROFINANCE REGULATION IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF CURRENT PRACTICE 41 (2002),
https://www.microfinancegateway.org/library/microfinance-regulationdeveloping-countries-comparative-review-current-practice
[https://perma.cc/8328-PJGX]. The high rates that Compartamos charges
its borrowers are also partly due to the lack of competition in the Mexican
banking industry. See Chu, supra note 28, at 127.
218 See Brigit Helms & David Porteous, Protecting Microfinance
Borrowers,
CGAP
FOCUS
NOTE,
May
2005,
at
1
http://www.cgap.org/publications/protecting-microfinance-borrowers
[https://perma.cc/KDP4-ZPYF].
219 See Ryan Bubb & Alex Kaufman, Consumer Biases and Mutual
Ownership, 105 J. P UB . E CON . 39 (2013) (arguing that credit unions are
less likely to engage in predatory pricing practices).
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social investors have difficulty tapping equity capital
markets since dispersed profit-seeking investors may fear
that the firm will forego profits in order to pursue some
unverifiable social mission. While some social enterprises do
issue public shares, such issuances are usually of relatively
small amounts of shares with limited voting rights.
Additionally, the shares are often traded on matched-bargain
systems that lack the liquidity afforded by large stock
exchanges.220
Social enterprises are better able to attract capital
primarily in two situations. The first is where the costs of
gathering information are low and the subsidies made to
patron-beneficiaries are relatively small. Firms like
Compartamos, which primarily serves the moderate and
marginally poor, but not the destitute, face few information
asymmetries and therefore do not need a significant subsidy
to begin with. Moreover, over time, Compartamos has
reduced the costs of lending to low-income borrowers. Thus,
the subsidy it needs from its investors is minimal (if any),
and the firm can generate substantial profits.221 The second
is where consumers, donors, or the government, rather than
the investors, pay the subsidies. Fair trade products are one
prominent example. Usually subsidized by the consumers,
fair trade products have become profitable businesses for
large corporations.
Nonetheless, there is a growing trend among institutional
investors to invest in socially responsible businesses,
resulting in the gradual expansion of the social investment
220 See the supra Section II.A.1 (discussing Triodos Bank and
Cafédirect); Jamie Hartzell, Creating an Ethical Stock Exchange (Aug.
2007) (Oxford Said Bus. Sch., Skoll Ctr. for Soc. Entrepreneurship
Working
Paper),
http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/ideasimpact/skoll/research/social-finance-reports-resources/creating-ethicalstock-exchange [https://perma.cc/28CH-EDTQ].
221 It is fair to claim that, at this stage, Compartamos has become a
standard profit-maximizing firm, because it no longer receives substantial
subsidies and it does not have a material commitment to lend to
disadvantaged groups that lack access to capital.
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sector.222 Recent reports suggest that there is a great deal of
untapped capital from socially responsible funds,
foundations, high net worth individuals, and even public
investors.223 However, altruistic investors presumably want
assurance that their funds are well used. Such investors may
in principle use control or contractual mechanisms to
monitor the social enterprise, but for many investors such
monitoring may be too costly. Consequently, passive
investors tend to resist investing in social enterprises whose
efficacy they cannot oversee. Currently, with some
exceptions, no institutional mechanisms exist to signal a
credible commitment to such passive investors. One possible
solution may be a certification mechanism. The Fair Trade
certification, albeit imperfect, has proven to serve as a
reasonably effective commitment to many dispersed
consumers. Section IX.B below considers a broader
certification mechanism for a wider class of social
enterprises which would be partly directed towards altruistic
investors as well as consumers who have limited means to
control or directly contract with the firm.

VIII. OTHER ACCOUNTS OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
AND HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS
There are several other theories that have been proposed
to explain social enterprises and hybrid organizations. As
demonstrated below, these theories have failed to provide a
convincing account of social enterprise and hybrid
organizations.

See supra Section VI.B.
J.P. MORGAN GLOB. RESEARCH & THE ROCKEFELLER FOUND., supra
note 3; KARIM HARJI & EDWARD T. JACKSON, E.T. JACKSON & ASSOCS. LTD.,
ACCELERATING IMPACT: ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES AND WHAT'S NEXT IN
BUILDING
THE
IMPACT
INVESTING
INDUSTRY
(2012),
https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/app/uploads/Accelerating-ImpactFull-Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJ4X-9HSX].
222
223
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A. Stakeholder Theories and the Costs of DecisionMaking
The upshot of stakeholder theories is that managers
should maximize the interests of all stakeholders of the firm,
including employees, customers, and even the public at
large.224 Some commentators have advanced a view of social
enterprise and hybrid organizations as a form of for-profit
entity that maximizes the interests of its stakeholders.225
The major problem with these theories is that they fail to
explain how managers should balance competing claims.
Without providing clear criteria as to how the stakeholders’
interests should be considered in corporate decision-making,
broad managerial discretion enables managers to pursue
their own interests.226 Hybrid organizations with broad social
and environmental missions are particularly vulnerable to
this risk because of the difficulty of defining and verifying
what kind of action maximizes the social mission.

There are numerous articles on the topic. See, e.g., Margaret M.
Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
V A . L. R EV . 247 (1999); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the
Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. R EV . 733 (2005). To be sure, most proponents
of shareholder primacy agree that a corporation can and should act in the
interests of its stakeholders and society as a whole to the extent that doing
so indirectly promotes the shareholders’ interest. See Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 G EO . L.J.
439 (2001); Michael C. Jensen et al., Value Maximization, Stakeholder
Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working
Paper
No.
00-058,
2000),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?cfid=768189&cftoken=41041396&
abstract_id=220671## [https://perma.cc/L32L-R4LK].
225 See generally T HE E MERGENCE OF SOCIAL E NTERPRISE , supra note
9; T HE E CONOMICS OF S OCIAL R ESPONSIBILITY : T HE W ORLD OF S OCIAL
E NTERPRISES , supra note 10; S OCIAL E NTERPRISE AT THE C ROSSROADS OF
M ARKET , P UBLIC P OLICIES AND C IVIL S OCIETY , supra note 212.
226 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 224, at 447–49; Jensen et al.,
supra note 224.
224
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Stakeholder theories also advocate allocating voting
rights and decision-making power to specific stakeholders.227
In fact, in some social enterprises, such as FTSEs, there may
be board members that represent a class of beneficiaries228 or
a class of beneficiaries that owns some shares in the firm.229
Only rarely, however, do beneficiaries truly take an active
part in decision-making, mainly because such a decisionmaking process could be highly cumbersome due to potential
conflicts among different stakeholders.
By contrast, decision-making in social enterprises seems
to be relatively efficient in resolving conflicts among
stakeholders. The reason is that the commitment device not
only serves as a credible commitment to utilizing subsidies
effectively, but it also mitigates the costs of decision-making
by defining how managers should utilize the subsidies.
Certification and contractual mechanisms define the class of
beneficiaries and the terms of their transactions with the
enterprise. Control mechanisms may potentially be
susceptible to tension between investors who want to
maximize profits and the nonprofit controllers who are
satisfied with below-market returns. However, as long as the
nonprofit maintains clear control of the social enterprise
firm, there seems to be relatively little scope for conflict.
Accordingly, managers are left with the task of pursuing
profits, subject to the commitment to transact with a class of

227 See Jacques Defourny, Introduction: From Third Sector to Social
Enterprise, in T HE E MERGENCE OF SOCIAL E NTERPRISE , supra note 9;
Jeffrey Moriarty, The Connection Between Stakeholder Theory and
Stakeholder Democracy: An Excavation and Defense, 53 BUS. & SOC’Y 820
(2012).
228 For example, the producers of Cafédirect, an FTSE that sells hot
drinks, have the right to appoint two directors to its board. CAFÉDIRECT,
supra note 52, at 8–9.
229 For example, the borrowers of Grameen Bank, a prominent MFI in
Bangladesh, hold approximately 76% of its shares as of 2015. GRAMEEN
BANK, ANNUAL REPORT 2015 59 (2016), http://www.grameen.com/wpcontent/uploads/bsk-pdf-manager/GB-2015_33.pdf [https://perma.cc/HP6PXRV4].
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beneficiaries. In this way, the commitment device effectively
defines how to balance the profit and nonprofit missions
against each other, so that the margin of discretion left to
managers is relatively limited.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the
measurement theory of social enterprises is not necessarily
inconsistent with stakeholder theories whose ultimate
objective is to create organizations that benefit nonshareholder groups. Instead, it asserts that in order to do
this effectively, the organization must have an actual stake
in the development of the beneficiaries, rather than rely on
broad managerial discretion. Thus, social enterprises may be
viewed as a practical mechanism for operationalizing the
stakeholder model.

B. Economies of Scope
Malani & Posner (“MP”)230 and Henderson & Malani
(“HM,” and together “MPH”)231 argue that for-profits are
more efficient than nonprofits in pursuing social goals
because they benefit from economies of scope.232 A car
company may have more ample resources and knowledge
than nonprofits to invest in research on hybrid engines than
government or nonprofits. However, other examples provided
by MPH have questionable theoretical and empirical
support. For example, they suggest that multinational coffee
companies are more efficient in disbursing charity to poor
farmers. As discussed above, however, multinational
companies have generally avoided transacting with poor
disaggregated farmers primarily because the costs of
transacting with those farmers tend to be high. In fact, the
Malani & Posner, supra note 6.
M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and
the Market for Altruism, 109 C OLUM . L. R EV . 571 (2009).
232 For elaborate criticisms, see Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable,
88 T EX . L. R EV . 1213 (2010); James R. Hines Jr. et al., The Attack on
Nonprofit Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 M ICH . L. R EV . 1179
(2010).
230
231
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contacts between most large firms and small farmers are
initiated and fostered by nonprofits.233 To take another
example, MPH argue that clothing and footwear
manufacturers, such as Nike, are better positioned than
nonprofits to monitor the working conditions in factories in
developing countries. Surely, every organization that is
contravening certain standards is best positioned to ensure
that such standards are held in compliance. But clearly, such
manufacturers have an obvious incentive to shirk on the
quality of working conditions to save costs. In fact, the
pressure on such manufacturers comes from various
nonprofits. Accordingly, the efficiency claim is not
convincing.
MPH also claim that for-profits are just as trustworthy or
committed as nonprofits.234 Donors or subsidy providers do
not need to patronize a nonprofit to use their funds for
charitable purposes; rather, they can simply channel their
donation or subsidy through a for-profit firm. The nondistribution constraint is not essential as a commitment
device. For-profits can simply commit by contract not to
distribute profits and a private auditor can monitor this
commitment.235 However, the feasibility of this contract
depends on the availability of measurable standards.236
Moreover, even if firms could enter into such a contract, in
practice virtually none of the examples of for-profit charities
discussed by MPH involve such a contract. These examples
include: Google’s charitable arm; fair trade coffee sold by
Starbucks; and Nike’s abstinence from purchasing supplies
from sweatshops. None of these firms have contracted to not
distribute profits to their owners. Accordingly, MPH fail to

233 For examples, see AUSTIN & REAVIS, supra note 127; Argenti, supra
note 127.
234 Malani & Posner, supra note 6, at 2035–36.
235 Id.
236 For a detailed criticism of private monitoring of the nondistribution constraint, see Galle, supra note 232, at 1218–21.
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describe what substitutes for the non-distribution constraint
for-profits have adopted as commitment devices.

C. Public Good Theories
The above discussion assumes that social enterprises are
designed for the benefit of a specified class of patrons, such
as consumers or employees. In practice, the role of social
enterprises may be viewed as one of generating public goods.
For example, MFIs and CDFIs are widely regarded as tools
for alleviating poverty. Social enterprises, on this view, are
supposed to benefit external beneficiaries who are affiliated
with the patron-beneficiaries. A borrower that receives a
loan from an MFI or works at a WISE may be able to send
his or her children to school and obtain better healthcare
services. Likewise, the availability of healthcare services,
medicines, or products such as eyeglasses, enhances
productivity and reduces the costs of illness.
However, the evidence on the effects of social enterprises
as providers of public goods is largely equivocal. MFIs are a
case in point. Empirical studies show no clear evidence that
MFIs uniformly alleviate poverty and improve the standard
of living in a given community in areas such as healthcare
and education.237 On the other hand, there is strong evidence
that access to credit has improved the lives of the borrowers

237 See, e.g., Abhijit Banerjee et al., The Miracle of Microfinance?
Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Dep’t. of
Econ.
Working
Paper
No.
13-09,
2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2250500
[https://perma.cc/Y766-8LCH]; Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman,
Expanding Microenterprise Credit Access: Using Randomized Supply
Decision to Estimate the Impacts in Manila (Yale Econ. Dep’t Working
Paper
No.
68,
2009),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1444990
[https://perma.cc/SV2W-6WKM]; David Roodman & Jonathan Morduch,
The Impact of Microcredit on the Poor in Bangladesh: Revisiting the
Evidence (Ctr. for Glob. Dev., Working Paper No. 174, 2013),
http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1422302
[https://perma.cc/J5DY-XL9N].
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themselves.238 It seems to be the case, then, that the patronbeneficiaries of MFIs have substantially benefited from the
ability to transact with MFIs, while the benefits to the
community at large are inconclusive.
The distinction between patron-beneficiaries and external
beneficiaries may be the reason for these results. The
positive externalities which arguably flow to external
beneficiaries of MFIs are somewhat uncertain and may
depend on numerous factors. For example, the availability of
credit may improve a family’s financial situation, but
without educational opportunities or the availability of
healthcare services, it will do little to improve education or
health. There is similar empirical data with respect to fair
trade and its effect on communities of small farmers.239 The
ability to transact with FTSEs has increased the income of
individual farmers and their households, but though there is
some evidence of modest positive effects on education and
health, it is inconclusive and falls short of showing clear
results.240
In fact, consistent with the claim of this Article, most
social enterprises simply evaluate their impact by measuring
the extent to which they transact with patron-beneficiaries,
for example, the total output sold to low-income consumers
(e.g., bed nets sold), the number of disadvantaged workers
Banerjee et al., supra note 237 (finding that microcredit supports
household borrowing and investments and the creation and expansion of
small businesses, but has no impact on health, education and women’s
decision-making); COLLINS ET AL., supra note 142 (claiming that
microfinance may be most effective at smoothing out borrowers’ cash
flows, so that poor borrowers are less vulnerable to fluctuations in their
income); Karlan & Zinman, supra note 237 (finding that the introduction
of micro-lending to new populations leads to an increase in business
profits for male borrowers, but no overall effects on income or poverty).
239 For a review of impact studies, see NICHOLLS & OPAL, supra note
45, at 201–28; Ann Le Mare, The Impact of Fair Trade on Social and
Economic Development: A Review of the Literature, 2/6 G EOGRAPHY
C OMPASS 1922 (2008).
240 NICHOLLS & OPAL, supra note 45, at 208–09; Le Mare, supra note
239.
238
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employed, or the number of loans made.241 Note that by
definition these transactions would not have taken place
without social enterprises. Accordingly, it appears to be
relatively easier to measure the effects of social enterprises
on their patron-beneficiaries.242 Vis-à-vis their external
beneficiaries, social enterprises are in a similar position to
donative organizations; unless the benefits to external
beneficiaries are measurable at reasonable cost, they remain
uncertain.

D. Sustainability and Scale
Several commentators have suggested that social
enterprises have emerged as a solution to capital constraints
faced by donative organizations. According to this view,
social enterprises are more financially sustainable than
donative organizations because they can generate revenues.
Donative organizations are ineffective in pursuing their
missions due to limited funding from donors.243 Greater
241 See ALNOOR EBRAHIM & V. KASTURI RANGAN, ACUMEN FUND:
MEASUREMENT
IN
VENTURE
PHILANTHROPY
(A)
(2009),
http://acumen.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Case-Study-HBS-EcotactMeridian.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9LJ-BWMF]; GREYSTON, ANNUAL REPORT
2015
6
(2016),
http://greyston.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/09/greyston_report_2015_02_online_pk_sm.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VD47-DRZB] (144 disadvantaged workers employed);
CARVER FED. SAV. BANK, WE ARE THE COMMUNITY 2 (2016),
https://www.carverbank.com/brochure#page/4
[https://perma.cc/QT4NSRDP] (152 commercial loans originated).
242 To be sure, certain methodological difficulties exist also when
measuring impact with respect to patron-beneficiaries, and most studies
are subject to some weaknesses, including (a) difficulties in assessing
counterfactuals, i.e., the hypothetical situation if patron-beneficiaries had
not transacted with the social enterprise, and (b) selection biases, e.g.,
social enterprises may choose to transact with patron-beneficiaries with
higher abilities.
243 M UHAMMAD Y UNUS , C REATING A W ORLD WITHOUT P OVERTY :
S OCIAL B USINESS AND THE F UTURE OF C APITALISM (2008); PALLOTTA,
supra note 161; Dees, supra note 9, 55–56; Jerr Boschee & Jim McClurg,
Towards a Better Understanding of Social Entrepreneurship (2003)
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sources of revenue enable social enterprises to scale the
firm’s operations.244 Without scaling, firms cannot reach a
large number of beneficiaries and have a substantial social
impact. For example, an MFI with a small number of
borrowers arguably has only a modest social impact, whereas
one with numerous branches and borrowers has a larger
social impact. Some go further by arguing that the ability to
distribute profits and tap equity capital is critical to
obtaining the capital necessary to scale the firms’ operations,
and hence their social impact; for example, a for-profit MFI
can reach more borrowers than a nonprofit MFI.245
These views, however, suffer from several weaknesses.
First, there is no systematic evidence that earned income is
more sustainable than donative income.246 Donative
organizations, such as large foundations and aid agencies,
have very substantial funds. The real problem is that the
utilization of these funds, particularly towards development
goals, has often been ineffective.247 In fact, there is little
reason to believe that simply increasing the amounts of
donations would generate different results. Second, evidence
suggests that nonprofits with no access to equity capital can
achieve a substantial scale similar to that of for-profits.
Nonprofit MFIs, such as ASA and BRAC, serve millions of
borrowers and have as wide a reach as for-profit MFIs.248 In

(unpublished
manuscript),
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/phpprograms/courses/fileDL.php?fID=7289 [https://perma.cc/7UUV-BHW5];.
244 YUNUS, supra note 243; J.P. MORGAN GLOB. RESEARCH & THE
ROCKEFELLER FOUND., supra note 3, at 13.
245 See Chu, supra note 28.
246 Beth Battle Anderson & J. Gregory Dees, Rhetoric, Reality, and
Research: Building a Solid Foundation for the Practice of Social
Entrepreneurship, in S OCIAL E NTREPRENEURSHIP : N EW M ODELS OF
S USTAINABLE S OCIAL C HANGE , supra note 9, at 144, 148–50.
247 See supra note 84.
248 In Bangladesh, ASA and BRAC served around 6 million and 5
million
respectively
in
2015.
See
ASA,
THE
MIX,
https://www.themix.org/mixmarket/profiles/asa
[https://perma.cc/C9AK8HAN]
(last
visited
Mar.
18,
2017);
BRAC,
THE
MIX,
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some cases, attracting equity capital may be necessary for
scaling. As explained above, however, when social
enterprises transact with beneficiaries with lower abilities,
equity capital is less likely to be available, and subsidies in
the form of donations and income tax exemptions remain
essential.249
To be sure, social enterprises are better than donative
organizations at scaling their social impact. But the reason
for this is that social enterprises allocate subsidies more
efficiently. For example, while a donative organization might
distribute a good (e.g., a bed net) worth $5 to say 200
beneficiaries, a social enterprise using the same amount of
subsidies (i.e., $1,000) may be able to distribute the good to
100 beneficiaries that cannot afford to pay for it, and sell the
rest for say, $3 to 250 beneficiaries (i.e., $2 subsidy per
beneficiary) that can afford to pay this amount. In this
example, the social enterprise can reach more beneficiaries
(350 as compared with 100) because it has more information
on beneficiaries’ abilities to pay. The measurement role of
social enterprises thus enables them to scale their social
impact as compared to donative organizations.

IX. LEGAL HYBRID FORMS AND HOW TO REFORM
THEM
Many U.S. states and different countries have introduced
new legal hybrid forms in recent years. The main purpose of
such legal forms is to facilitate the flow of subsidized capital
to for-profit social enterprises from a growing class of
altruistic investors, ethically conscious consumers, private
foundations, and even government. As pointed out above, a
great deal of untapped capital is potentially available for
investments in firms that promote social purposes at belowmarket returns,250 and there is evidence that ethicallyhttps://www.themix.org/mixmarket/profiles/brac
598R] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
249 See supra Section VII.B.
250 Id.

[https://perma.cc/J9KN-
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conscious consumers are increasingly willing to pay
significant premiums over market prices for products of
firms that do good.251
Gaining access to this capital is a particular problem for
for-profit social enterprises because they lack a standardized
commitment device (such as the non-distribution constraint)
to assure their investors, customers, and the government
that they utilize subsidies effectively, and there is an obvious
risk that those who control an organization will expropriate
the subsidies it receives.252 Most investors and consumers do
not have resources to monitor closely the social purpose of
the firm they invest in or buy products from, especially when
measuring social impact is uncertain. The costs of control
and contractual commitment devices are high and require
substantial monitoring. Moreover, foundations face
substantial regulatory hurdles in making investments in
social enterprises, also known as “program related
investments” (“PRIs”), and may be subject to tax penalties or
even lose their exempt status if they fail to monitor the social
purpose of such investments.253 To reassure providers of
251 The mean premium for socially responsible products was recently
estimated to be about 17% over market prices of equivalent products.
Stephanie M. Tully & Russell S. Winer, The Role of the Beneficiary in
Willingness to Pay for Socially Responsible Products: A Meta-analysis, 90
J. RETAILING 255 (2014).
252 As explained above, this is essentially the role of the nondistribution constraint in the case of nonprofit corporations. See supra
Section III.A.
253 A detailed analysis of PRIs is outside the scope of this Article. In
summary, PRIs are subsidized investments by private foundations in
firms that promote one of the well known exempt purposes, such as
educational, scientific, literary or charitable purpose. 26 U.S.C § 4944(c)
(2016). The main advantage of PRIs is that they count towards
foundations’ minimum annual distribution requirements. 26 C.F.R.
§ 53.4942(a)–3(a)(2) (2016). The main problem with PRIs is that for
investments to qualify as PRIs, foundations need to follow detailed and
costly procedures which are set out in the expenditure responsibility rules,
including monitoring the investees and making reports to the IRS. 26
U.S.C. § 4945(h) (2016); 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945–5 (2016). Failure to follow
these rules could result in the foundation’s paying significant tax penalties
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subsidized capital and income, legal hybrid forms must
identify a particular structure that gives hybrid
organizations incentives to utilize subsidies effectively. In
this way, such forms can verify that certain for-profits firms
can be trusted to employ subsidies to benefit third parties.
As argued below, existing legal hybrids fail to do this,
mainly because they rely on a vague notion of combining
profit and social mission. Consequently, most social
enterprises continue to use the existing legal forms.
Although an increasing number of small businesses are
using these forms mainly for marketing purposes,254 few of
them seem to have a particularly important social impact,
and those that do usually retain the same structure and
social mission that they had before they converted from the
for-profit form.255 Moreover, despite the recent IPO of
Laureate Education Inc.—the first IPO by a Benefit
Corporation—it is unlikely that legal hybrid forms will
facilitate liquid public markets for true social enterprises.256
Finally, despite lobbying attempts to allow some form of tax
subsidy for businesses that incorporate as legal hybrids, no

or even losing its tax-exempt status. See Callison & Vestal, supra note 8.
Consequently, few foundations make any PRIs. See LILLY FAMILY SCH. OF
PHILANTHROPY, LEVERAGING THE POWER OF FOUNDATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF
PROGRAM-RELATED
INVESTING
2
(2013),
https://philanthropy.iupui.edu/files/research/complete_report_final_51713.
pdf [https://perma.cc/6UP5-WE6Z].
254 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable
Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 607 (2011); Jen
Friedman, The Benefit Corporation: A Tool for Building a Sustainable
Brand,
CMO
(Apr.
22,
2015),
http://www.cmo.com/opinion/articles/2015/4/20/the-benefit-corporation-atool-for-building-a-sustainable-brand.html#gs.wDIcMVk
[https://perma.cc/S4JE-QBX3].
255 The Greyston Bakery discussed infra is one example. See infra
note 270 and accompanying text.
256 For
discussion of Laureate Education, see supra text
accompanying notes 12–13.

ELDAR – FINAL

186

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2017

such subsidy has been introduced.257 Perhaps more
importantly, investments in legal hybrid forms have not
been recognized as PRIs, and therefore few foundations have
made investments in such firms.258
The following discussion first describes the legal hybrid
forms, and in particular the Benefit Corporation. It then
outlines a potential reform that can address the deficiencies
in such forms. In particular, this Section argues that in order
to serve as a credible commitment device, the design of legal
hybrid forms should be based on the notion of transacting
with the beneficiaries advanced in this article.

A. Legal Hybrid Forms
Two prominent examples of hybrid forms are the LowProfit Limited Liability Company (“L3C”) and the Benefit
Corporation. The L3C is a Limited Liability Company
(“LLC”) that significantly furthers the accomplishment of
one or more charitable or educational purposes, and no
significant purpose of the company is the production of
income or the appreciation of property.259 Realizing profit
and enhancing value can be purposes of the enterprise as
long as they are not significant purposes. This definition
reflects the notion of mixed mission that underlies the
common definition of hybrid organizations. Merely stating
that a firm has a mixed mission, however, is unlikely to give
subsidy providers reasonable assurance that their subsidy is
being used effectively, especially given the difficulty of
measuring social impact. Moreover, it is hard to see what the
L3C adds over and above the standard LLC form, since
members of an LLC can simply add a provision to the LLC
agreement that contractually commits all of them to a
particular social purpose.
257 See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph R. Ganahl, Taxing Social
Enterprise, 66 S TAN . L. R EV . 387, 390–91 (2014).
258 Callison & Vestal, supra note 8, at 279.
259 For the Vermont L3C Act (the first L3C statute), see 11 VT. STAT.
ANN. § 3001(27) (2008) (repealed 2016).
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Benefit Corporations are defined as corporations whose
purpose is to create a “general public benefit.” General public
benefit in most states’ statutes means “a material positive
impact on society and the environment.”260 Specific benefits
include some activities associated with social enterprises as
defined here, for example, providing beneficial services and
products to low-income communities. However, they go
further to include largely any social purpose, including for
example “conferring any other particular benefit on society
or the environment.”261 Accordingly, just like the L3C, the
Benefit Corporation is based on the concept of mixed
mission. Partly to address the uncertainty inherent in this
concept, the Benefit Corporation statutes of most states
require that impact on society and the environment be
measured by a third-party standard,262 i.e., a social rating
certifier.263 As discussed above, however, social ratings
themselves are subject to many imperfections, and may
provide poor information to consumers or other subsidy
providers on the social value of hybrid organizations.
In addition, Benefit Corporation statutes include strong
constituency provisions that require directors and officers to
consider the interests of different stakeholders, including
260 M ODEL
B ENEFIT
C ORP .
L EGIS .
§
102
(2014),
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/Model_Benefit_Corp_Le
gislation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S7DY-3XAG]
[hereinafter
MODEL
LEGISLATION].
261 MODEL LEGISLATION § 102. Under the Delaware Code, “Public
benefit” means “a positive effect (or reduction of negative effects) on 1 or
more categories of persons, entities, communities or interests (other than
stockholders in their capacities as stockholders) including, but not limited
to, effects of an artistic, charitable, cultural, economic, educational,
environmental, literary, medical, religious, scientific or technological
nature.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(b) (2014).
262 Third-party standard is defined as “a recognized standard for
defining, reporting, and assessing corporate social and environmental
performance.” MODEL LEGISLATION § 102. Note that under Delaware law,
certification by a third-party standard is only optional. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 366(b) (2014).
263 The certifier is often B-Lab, although other certifiers may be used.
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customers, employees, the community in which the firm
operates, the local and global environment, and any other
group that the directors deem appropriate.264 The major risk
of such provisions is that directors may use them mainly to
entrench themselves at the expense of shareholders and
potentially other stakeholders. Although shareholders with
more than two percent holdings could sue the directors for
failure to pursue public or specific benefits,265 the directors
have ample discretion as to the weight they choose to give to
the interests of different groups, and they need not give
priority to any particular consideration or factors.266
Moreover, as in standard business corporations, directors
and officers have the protection of the business judgment
rule, which largely means that if they were informed and
acted in good faith, they are considered to have fulfilled their
duties.267 The ability of directors of Benefit Corporations to
entrench themselves, coupled with the weakness of many
social rating standards, makes the Benefit Corporation a
questionable vehicle for attracting subsidies from consumers,
investors, and the government.268

MODEL LEGISLATION §§ 301(a), 303(a).
Id. § 305.
266 Id. § 301(a)(3). For example, the Delaware Benefit Corporation
statute states that directors need to balance “the pecuniary interests of the
stockholders, the best interests of those materially affected by the
corporation's conduct, and the specific public benefit or public benefits
identified in its certificate of incorporation.” See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
365(a).
267 MODEL LEGISLATION §§ 301(e), 303(e).
268 In fact, the early evidence on Benefit Corporations shows that a
significant portion of them choose to incorporate in Nevada. See Ellen
Berrey, How Many Benefit Corporations Are There? (May 5, 2015)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2602781
[https://perma.cc/KX6Q-FKKC]. Nevada is a state known for its
managerialist corporate laws that exempt managers from fiduciary duties
by default. See Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada
as a Liability-Free Jurisdiction, 98 V A . L. R EV . 935 (2012). While promanagerial laws may not necessarily harm the value of small firms that
typically self-select into Nevada, they raise particular concerns when
264
265
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To be sure, the Benefit Corporation form does include
helpful provisions for owners that want to commit to some
social purpose. In particular, termination of Benefit
Corporation status must be approved by a qualified
majority—typically two-thirds—of the shareholders.269 This
provision effectively gives one-third of the shareholders
control over the mission. In fact, the Greyston Bakery
recently converted into a New York Benefit Corporation,
probably in anticipation of the Greyston Foundation’s selling
a stake to for-profit investors but maintaining control of the
firm.270 However, while this provision is helpful in creating a
form of control mechanism, the same commitment device can
be created with existing legal forms, for example, by adding
a charter provision that gives a nonprofit control over the
firm’s mission.271 Moreover, this type of control mechanism
on its own may have limited utility as a commitment device
to a large class of consumers, who may not know which
managers are given untrammeled discretion to pursue vague and largely
undefined public benefits. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein,
Nevada and the Market for Corporate Law, 35 S EATTLE U. L. R EV . 1165
(2012); Ofer Eldar, Can Lax Corporate Law Increase Shareholder Value?
Evidence from Nevada (on file with author).
269 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11a § 21.07 (2016).
270 See
Benefit
Corporation,
GREYSTON
BAKERY,
http://greyston.com/the-bakery-open-hiring/benefit-corporation/
[https://perma.cc/8UFY-W8RT] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017); New York law
actually requires a three-fourths majority for terminating the Benefit
Corporation status. See 17 N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1702, 1705 (McKinney
2012). Similarly, Patagonia, an environmentally friendly firm
reincorporated as a California Benefit Corporation to benefit from a
similar provision. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 14604 (West 2012); supra Section
VI.D.
271 See supra Section V.C. As discussed above, though, some
statements by Chancellor Chandler in Ebay v. Newark suggest that it is
not possible to commit a Delaware corporation to a social purpose. See
supra note 4. But, as pointed out in supra note 4, the eBay case did not
involve a specific charter provision that required the firm to pursue a
social mission. Rather, the court reviewed the legality of a poison pill
mechanism adopted by management against minority shareholders’ will.
See id.
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owners control the social mission and would therefore need
to rely on the third party rating.

B. Outline for Reform
The core of the following reform proposal is to shift the
focus of legal hybrid forms from organizations with mixed
missions to firms that commit to transacting with
disadvantaged groups as investees, workers, producers,
consumers, etc. This reform may be achieved by simply
modifying the Benefit Corporation and certification system.
Details of this reform will be discussed in future work;272 for
present purposes, its main features are outlined below.
First, this requires a new form of certification for social
enterprise. Certification would be awarded if a certain
percentage of the business of the firm, including its affiliates,
is based on transactions with a set of carefully defined
classes of beneficiaries. The beneficiaries would be defined by
reference to certain criteria of need (for example, levels of
income, disability, or location). Certification may be
conducted by a private organization, similar to Fair Trade
certification. It may also be conducted by a newly formed
government agency, similar to the CDFI Fund. The main
innovation is that the certification would apply to a wider
class of beneficiaries, including, for example, low-income
workers. To keep the certification sufficiently flexible,
different types of beneficiaries (e.g., borrowers) may be
divided into subclasses in accordance with some measures of
need.273 Most states’ Benefit Corporation statutes do
recognize the need for certifying social impact. However,
they are misguided in requiring firms to certify a
comprehensive social impact standard that is inherently
Eldar, supra note 21.
Creating standards for different classes of beneficiaries would be
particularly challenging if these criteria extend to developing countries.
However, collaboration among a federal agency, multilateral organizations
such as the World Bank, and NGOs should be able to address this
challenge. See Eldar, supra note 21.
272
273
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uncertain. If B-Corp or another certification, private or
governmental, focused primarily on verifying the
transactional relationship with disadvantaged groups, it
could serve as a credible commitment device.
Second, Benefit Corporations would be required to obtain
this certification. Whereas under the current version of the
Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, firms have freedom
to choose a third party standard to measure their social
purpose, firms would be limited to one type of certification.
Certification would also require Benefit Corporations to
include an explicit commitment in the firm’s certificate of
incorporation (or other equivalent constitutional document)
to transact with one or more classes of disadvantaged
groups. Moreover, the name of Benefit Corporation would be
changed to include “BC” (for “Benefit Corporation”) or “SE”
(for “Social Enterprise”) as a suffix. This way, when investors
buy their shares or when consumers buy their products, they
would have notice that the firm transacts with a class of
beneficiaries, and hence it is likely to use subsidies
effectively.
In this respect, some of the provisions of Benefit
Corporations may be superfluous while others remain
valuable. On the one hand, the provisions requiring
managers to consider the interest of all stakeholders have
limited utility and would be unnecessary under this
proposal. Subject to the certification, Benefit Corporations
could pursue profits like any other commercial firm. On the
other hand, there is value in keeping the provisions that
require a super-majority for terminating the Benefit
Corporation status. This way, investors, whether individuals
or foundations, would have assurance that the firm will not
change its mission after investors have already invested
capital to support the social mission of the firm.
This proposal may not be as provocative as it may first
appear. As discussed above, CDFIs already operate well
under a federal certification regime that verifies that they
serve specified target markets, and Fair Trade certification
has become part of mainstream retail. Moreover, in several
European jurisdictions there are hybrid legal forms, which
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are exclusively designed for firms certified as WISEs if a
percentage of their workers belong to disadvantaged
groups.274 A centralized federal agency focused on
development missions could be established to certify a wider
range of social enterprises. In fact, even the nonprofit form
may be viewed as a system whereby there is a government
certifier, i.e., the Internal Revenue Service, that primarily
ensures that nonprofits are precluded from distributing
profits (and hence, are more likely to distribute them to their
beneficiaries), and state corporation law governs the internal
affairs of the firm.
This reform has the potential for unlocking much-needed
capital for social entrepreneurs. It would enable dispersed
investors and consumers to donate more funds to social
enterprises. To this extent, it may also enable social
enterprises to issue public shares. Moreover, it could
potentially serve as the basis for allocating tax benefits to
social enterprises. Investments in the reformed Benefit
Corporations could qualify automatically as PRIs by
foundations. The social enterprise certification proposed
above could, in this respect, replace the complicated and
cumbersome process for making and approving PRIs; the
reason is that certified Benefit Corporations would be
structured such that they have incentives to pursue
development missions effectively. In fact, most PRIs are
actually made in businesses that have transactional
relationships with their beneficiaries, such as businesses
that employ low-income individuals.275 By streamlining the
PRI process and relieving foundations of potential liabilities
for making PRIs, this proposal could facilitate the flow of
substantial capital to social enterprises.
274 One prominent example is the Type B Italian social cooperative.
See Cafaggi & Iamiceli, supra note 5, at 7–15.
275 26 C.F.R. § 53.4944–3 (2016). These examples include businesses
owned by members of economically disadvantaged or minority groups,
businesses that sell agricultural products sourced from low-income
farmers in depressed rural areas, and a variety of low-cost providers of
essential goods and services, such as vaccines sold in developing countries.
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X. CONCLUSION
Social enterprise and other hybrid organizations are often
discussed as an alternative to the traditional form of
capitalism, which is based on the norms of profitmaximization and shareholder primacy. These accounts tend
to define social enterprises and hybrids simply as
organizations that mix profit-seeking with social missions or
firms with duties towards multiple stakeholders. The theory
offered here effectively dispels such claims because the role it
ascribes to social enterprises is not intrinsically inconsistent
with the traditional role of corporations. Social enterprises
can be profit-maximizing if the subsidies they receive flow
from government or consumers rather than from owners.
Even if the owners do provide the subsidies, social
enterprises may still act under a shareholder primacy norm
as long as the owners agree to provide such subsidies.
Accordingly, the theoretical underpinning of social enterprise
is not, as some have argued, its apparent divergence from
profit-maximization or shareholder primacy. At the same
time, the theory is not necessarily inconsistent with the
objective of stakeholder models either, since social
enterprises are clearly structured to benefit non-shareholder
groups. Rather, the theory may be viewed as an effective way
to implement such models by giving firms a financial stake in
the development of their beneficiaries.
The main contribution of the theory advanced here is to
identify the measurement role of social enterprises, and to
distinguish them from other hybrid organizations that
mainly engage in transferring subsidies to third party
beneficiaries. Organizations that give or transfer subsidies,
such as donative organizations or firms that engage in
corporate charity, work well mainly when the purpose of the
subsidies is relatively simple and hence there are no
information problems regarding their impact. Social
enterprises are designed to use subsidies to promote complex
missions, such as increasing employment opportunities or
facilitating access to credit. The commitment of social
enterprises to transacting with their beneficiaries is the key
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element in assuring subsidy providers that their subsidies
will be used effectively. This commitment essentially aligns
the interests of the firm with those of the subsidy providers.
Given their dependence on the performance of their
beneficiaries, social enterprises have an interest in ensuring
that the subsidies are not wasted and that beneficiaries are
provided with the optimal amount and type of disbursal. In
this way, the interests of social enterprises are aligned with
the interests of subsidy providers who presumably want
their subsidy to be used effectively.
The theory advanced in this Article may also inform legal
policy. It suggests that legal policy and, particularly, legal
hybrid forms should focus on a specific set of enterprises that
serve a measurement function. The limited usefulness of new
legal hybrid forms, such as the L3C or the Benefit
Corporation, is to a large extent due to their questionable
theoretical underpinnings. Legal forms for incorporating
firms with mixed missions inevitably fail to identify the
essential elements that make firms effective in utilizing
subsidies or to prescribe adequate commitment devices. It is
therefore not surprising that such forms have generally
failed to attract subsidies from tax authorities,276 which tend
to view them with suspicion.
Finally, this Article outlined a summary proposal for
reforming the Benefit Corporation and introducing a
certification mechanism for social enterprises that transact
with a wide range of disadvantaged groups. This proposal,
which builds on the success of both private certifications
such as Fair Trade, and government programs such as the
CDFI Fund, has the potential to facilitate the flow of capital
and income to social enterprises from a wide range of
altruistic investors and consumers. It is also likely to serve
as the basis for allocating tax benefits and government
subsidies to social enterprises, and especially for facilitating
program related investments from private foundations.
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Callison & Vestal, supra note 8.

